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ABSTRACT
For centuries fisheries institutions have shaped Rhode Island’s storied fishing
tradition, a hallmark of which has been access to marine resources by the residents of
the state. In 2001, after a series of moratoriums on commercial fishing licenses, Rhode
Island embarked on an extensive public process through the Coastal Institute at the
University of Rhode Island to identify fishery management options based on the input
of stakeholders. The outcome of that process was the passage of Senate Bill 2771 sub
A – otherwise known as Rhode Island Gen. Law 20.2-1 (2002). The legislation ended
a moratorium on the issuance of new commercial fishing licenses in the state, and
called for the establishment of license limitation programs that accommodate new
entry into state waters fisheries. In 2009, the state approved a catch share pilot
program, effectively changing how access to the resource is constructed.
This research seeks to better understand the impetus for preserving access to
the fishery in 2002, and determine if the catch share pilot program is consistent with
the original intent of the Act. A Grounded Theory methodology is employed to
illustrate the entire management situation leading up to the passage of Rhode Island
Gen. Law 20.2-1 (2002). The results of this research indicate that while access has not
been functionally compromised for new entrants through the enactment of a sector
pilot program, a normative and cognitive disconnect exists between the intent of the
legislation and the catch share pilot program. Moreover, the values and worldviews of
fisheries stakeholders in Rhode Island are influenced by a range of regional and
international institutions that did not inform the 2002 legislation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First, I would like to thank my advisor Robert Thompson for his unyielding
patience, assistance, and encouragement. I would also like to thank my committee
members, Dennis Nixon and Carlos Garcia-Quijano, for their time, flexibility, and
input. A special thanks to Judy Palmer, who was instrumental in helping me complete
this work, and to Michael Rice, my defense chair. Thanks to Seth Macinko for
thoughtful feedback and to Judith Swift, Q Kellogg and the Coastal Institute for
supporting my work. I am ever grateful for the support provided by my family.
Finally, thank you to Rebecca your encouragement, and for helping me see this project
through.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title

Page

Abstract

ii

Acknowledgements

iii

Table of Contents

iv

List of Tables

v

List of Figures

vi

Chapter 1 - Introduction

1

Chapter 2 - Literature Review

4

Chapter 3 - Fisheries Management in Rhode Island

16

Chapter 4 - Research Methodology

32

Chapter 5 - Analysis

48

Chapter 6 - Results and Recommendations

79

Appendicies

84

Bibliography

89

iv

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE

PAGE

Table 1. Common-Pool Resource Property Regimes. .................................................. 1
Table 2. Issuance of RFF Endorsements through entry-exit ratios: 2003 - 2012 ....... 26
Table 3. Varying Emphases: Three Pillars of Institutions ......................................... 44
Table 4. Institutional Pillars and Carriers ................................................................... 46
Table 5. Interpreting Context in Coding For Institutions ............................................ 49
Table 6. Initial (First-cycle) Categories ...................................................................... 51
Table 7. Keyword Search of Question 1 ..................................................................... 55

v

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE

PAGE

Figure 1. Timeline of Marine Licensing Revisions. ................................................... 22
Figure 2. Steps taken in Research Methodology. ........................................................ 33
Figure 3. Progression of the Snowball Sample ........................................................... 36
Figure 4. Distribution of Code Across Scott’s Institutional Pillars ............................ 50
Figure 5. Grounded Theory Categories ....................................................................... 52
Figure 6. Grounded Theory and Axial Codes with Institutional Pillars ..................... 53
Figure 7. Dimensions of Political and Regulatory Environment ................................ 59
Figure 8. Dimensions of Access.................................................................................. 61
Figure 9. Dimensions of Flexibility ............................................................................ 65
Figure 10. Dimensions of Sustainability ..................................................................... 69
Figure 11. Dimensions of Fisheries Management....................................................... 72

vi

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The question of access to marine resources is particularly significant in the Ocean
State because “Rhode Island has maintained a long tradition of allowing open access
to the state’s marine fisheries resources for its residents, and [in 2002] it was only one
of two coastal states nationwide to continue to do so” (Petruny-Parker et al., 2002,
p.138). In 2002, the Rhode Island General Assembly adopted a new law governing the
management of marine resources. Senate Bill 2771 sub A – now Rhode Island General
Law 20-2.1 – contains provisions that direct the Department of Environmental
Management to continue to preserve opportunity for access to commercial fisheries for
residents of the state (Appendix I).
In 2009, the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management
expanded its limited entry management program by adopting a catch share pilot
program in the summer flounder fishery. This new management regime uses an
allocation approach to regulate access to the fishery. With an existing directive to
provide opportunities for access codified in Rhode Island General Law, catch share
management may be at odds with the goal of preserving new entry into Rhode Island’s
commercial fisheries as catch share programs allocate catch among a pre-determined
set of entities based on qualifying criteria. Therefore, I hypothesize that the adoption
of catch share management is inconsistent with the intent of the 2002 Act and its
policy goal of preserving access for new entrants. Taken practically, if inconsistencies
exist between new entry provisions of the 2002 Act and catch share management
programs, can the two be reconciled? Do the new entry provisions of Senate Bill 2771
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sub A (2002) matter to Rhode Island eleven years after the bill was passed? What
other fisheries instituions have emerged in Rhode Island that have influence on the
collective’s thinking around management regimes?
Understanding the intent of the Act entails a more complete understanding on
the process that informed the bill. Two years before the bill was passed, the Coastal
Institute at the University of Rhode Island was tasked by Governor Lincoln Almond to
engage stakeholders and “examine options available for resolving the current
moratorium on commercial fishing licenses” (August and Parker, 2001, p.2). This
process constituted Phase 1 of the Coastal Institute’s two-phase approach. During
Phase 1, the CI, “sought the input of members of the commercial fishing industry, the
regulatory community, citizens, and academic experts” and “two basic objectives: 1)
to develop a list of the different goals that a commercial licensing system should
attain, and 2) create the list of different licensing available to the Joint Advisory
Working Group on Fisheries Management” (August and Parker, 2001, p.4). To help
answer the research question and garner a more complete understanding of the
General Assembly’s intent of the Act, this thesis reflects on the Coastal Institute
process that ultimately led to the passing of the Act.
To situate this work within the boarder theoretical context of fisheries
management – and to avoid presenting the research situation in a vacuum – Chapter 2
addresses the literature around fisheries management, including the bio-economic
rational for managing fisheries, limited entry in the form of license limitation,
catchshares, and resource regimes, and the dichotomy between state and federal
fisheries management practices. In Chapter 3, this thesis chronicles the historical,
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political, and regulatory context of fisheries management in the Ocean State,
beginning with access arrangements that pre-date the King Charles Charter of 1663.
The relevance of the Rhode Island Constitution and case law are discussed drawing
upon the work of Nixon (2001). Later, the public processes that led up to the passing
of RIGL 20.2-1 are outlined, and the operationalization of the subsequent limited entry
program by the DEM is examined. Finally, I discuss the management of summer
flounder and the sector pilot program that operated from 2009 – 2011, and the decision
to purse the sector program.
Chapter 4 discusses the research methodology of Grounded Theory (Glaser
and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Charmaz, 2006) in detail. Primary source
data was generated through semi-structured interviews, and analyzed through the lens
of Scott’s (1995) analytic framework, and Young’s institutional linkages (1996). In
Chapter 5, the data is analyzed in three ways. First, the data is reviewed to understand
if access and new entry was intent of the Act. Next, I apply Scott’s institutional
analysis to the Grounded Theory categories. This institutional analysis lends itself to a
discussion of local and global fisheries institutions that have shaped management in
the Ocean State. Results and recommendations are shared in Chapter 6.

3

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
This chapter begins with a review of the bio-economic rational for managing
fisheries as explained by Gordon (1953, 1954) and Schaefer (1959). Later, Ginter and
Rettig’s (1978) definition of limited entry is examined as it relates to fisheries
utilization, thereby framing a discussion on the common-pool nature of fisheries
(Berkes et al., 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Feeny et al., 1990). Bromley and Cernea’s (1989)
definitions of resource regimes are discussed and then applied to the regulations
governing fisheries in Rhode Island. Next, I discuss fisheries management literature
around catch shares. Finally, this thesis looks at dichotomy of state and federal
fisheries management established through federalism.
The Bio-economic Rational For Managing Fisheries
Fisheries resources were once thought to be inexhaustible (Grotius, 1608). The
depletion of inland fisheries did little to deter British biologist Thomas Huxley, who
was still, “espousing the effective inexhaustibility of oceanic resources,” as late as
1860 (Nielsen, 1976, p.15). Huxley’s notion of the inexhaustibility of fisheries has
been extinguished by the documented decline of fish populations around the world
(Mullon et al., 2005; Myers and Worm, 2003; Pauly et al., 2005; Worm, 2006;
Costello et al., 2008), and noted regionally in New England’s groundfish fishery
(Hennessey and Healey, 2000; Holland and McGuire, 2003; Acheson and Gardner,
2011).
Though fishing wields the power to greatly decrease the abundance and
biomass of fisheries, “populations of marine fishes are continuously renewed, and the
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rate of renewal depends on the size of the populations which is left unharvested to
produce new generations.” (Schaefer, 1959, p.100). The utilization of fishery
resources unleashes growth of the fish population. Therefore, the amount of fish that
are harvested – versus the amount that are left in the sea to reproduce – is a policy
question of what society deems most desirable. This situation lends itself to a suite of
policy and management options that achieve the long-term sustainability of the
resource with varying outcomes for society.
One management choice is maximum sustainable yield (MSY), which is the
level of harvest “at which the greatest poundage will be produced, on the average, in
perpetuity” (Schaefer, 1959, p.101). While MSY theoretically allows for the
maximum amount of removals from the fishery that can be renewed without
jeopardizing the health of the resource, the Magnuson-Stevens Act prescribes that we
manage toward optimum yield, or OY. Optimum yield is defined in the Act as the
level of harvest that:
(A) will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, particularly
with respect to food production and recreational opportunities, and
taking into account the protection of marine ecosystems;
(B) is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield
from the fishery, as reduced by any relevant economic, social, or
ecological factor; and
(C) in the case of an overfished fishery, provides for rebuilding to a
level consistent with producing the maximum sustainable yield in such
fishery. (16 U.S.C. 1892, Sec. 3(33)).
National Standard 1 states that “Conservation and management measures shall prevent
overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each
fishery for the United States fishing industry” (16 U.S.C. 1892, Sec. 301(a)(1)).
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Another level of harvest – which could be characterized as OY – is MEY, or
maximum economic yield. This is the level of harvest below MSY that yields the
largest difference between total revenue and total cost (industry profits). In other
terms, this is the highest level of sustainable harvest that can be achieved with the least
amount of fishing effort or cost (Iudicello et al., 1999). Still another policy option is
open access, which theoretically results in OAY, or open-access yield. Gordon (1954)
argues that entry into an open access fishery will increase as long as there is an
opportunity for net economic gain. The nature of marine fisheries lends itself to the
following situation:
In the sea fisheries the natural resource is not private property; hence the rent it
may yield is not capable of being appropriated by anyone. The individual
fisherman has no legal title to a section of ocean bottom. Each fisherman is more
or less free to fish wherever he pleases. The result is a pattern of competition
among fisherman which culminates in the dissipation of the rent of the intramarginal grounds (Gordon, 1954, p.131)

The fishery “will tend to come to natural stability where the total value of harvest is
equal to the cost of taking it, and the average return is equal to the average cost”
(Schaefer, 1959, p.102). This level of harvest is referred to as OAY, where total cost
equals total revenue. While this approach results in harvests greater than MSY on an
annual basis, the yield is theoretically sustainable. This is a policy option that will
theoretically maximize employment in the fishery.
Limited Entry
Fishery resources are not inexhaustible. Rather, under certain conditions, the
unfettered harvest of fish stocks may ultimately lead to severe declines in the
abundance of species (Iudicello et al. 41). While the traditional fisheries tool kit of
seasonal and area closures, and size and sex restrictions on catch were initially
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successful in curtailing the exploitation of fisheries, economists argued for
management regimes that would promote efficiencies (Copes, 1986). Limited entry
management schemes are intended to constrain harvests to sustainable levels, and to
reduce economic waste in the fishery by “curtail[ing] and restrict[ing] the addition of
fishermen, fishing vessels, or gear into the fishery. Hence, limited entry is an
alternative way of limiting effort” (Rettig and Ginter, 1978, p.158) The goals of
limited entry programs may vary considerably, and the structure of these programs can
take the form of license limitation, taxes and fees, catch shares, or any combination of
the three. License limitation refers to, “direct limitations on the number of licenses or
permits to harvest” (Rettig and Ginter, 1978, p.158). The tiered licensing system
employed by the DEM in Rhode Island’s state fisheries and discusses later in this
chapter is an example of a license limitation program. Another option, such as a tax
and fee approach can refer to cost recovery programs or royalty collection schedules
run by the state or federal government. The Washington Department of Fish and
Wildlife limit entry into their geoduck fishery where “a competitive bid process is
used to sell harvest contracts to the highest responsible bidder” (Washington State
Department of Fish and Game website, accessed on 12/16/12). Finally, the third
distinct form of limited entry is catch shares.
Catch Shares
As noted above, catch share management is a form of limited entry. This
management approach receives additional consideration in this chapter because the
state’s sector pilot program is a form of catch share management. Catch shares have
been defined as, “a general term for several fishery management strategies that
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allocate a specific portion of the total allowable catch to individuals, cooperative,
communities, or other entities” (United State Department of Commerce, Catch Share
Policy, 2010, p.i). In federally managed fisheries, some catch share arrangements are
considered Limited Access Privilege Programs or LAPPs. Others, such as sector
management implemented through Amendment 16 to the Northeast multispecies
Fishery Management Plan are not formal LAPPs under the Magnuson-Stevens Act (16
U.S.C. 1892).
In 2010, NOAA Fisheries codified a National Catch Share Policy, which
“encourages the consideration and adoption of catch shares wherever appropriate in
fishery management and ecosystem plans and their amendments” (United States
Department of Commerce, Catch Share Policy, 2010, p.ii). The policy also states that:
Catch shares may not be the best management option for every fishery or sector.
NOAA will not require the use of catch shares in any particular fishery or sector,
but it will promote and encourage the careful consideration of catch shares as a
means to achieve the conservation, social and economic goals of sustainable
fishery management. (Catch Share Policy, 2010, p.ii)

The policy also brought forward “criteria for consideration in the design and
implementation of catch share programs” which include specific management goals,
allocations, transferability, distinctions among fishery sectors, duration, fishing
community sustainability, royalties, cost recovery, and review process (United States
Department of Commerce, Catch Share Policy, 2010, p.iii).
Rights-Based Management
The rationale for allocating of a portion of the resource through an accessprivilege has roots in rights-based approaches to fisheries management. Scott (1955)
reasons that conferring access privileges to a sole owner or discrete set of entities:
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It is a commonplace to observe that for natural resources - as for other types of
wealth - "everybody's property is nobody’s property.” No on will take the trouble
to husband and maintain a resource unless he has a reasonable certainty of
receiving some portion of the product of his management; that is, unless he has
some property right to the yield (116).

Costello et al. (2008) argue that resource management by the state aimed at
maximizing profits may be ineffective in preventing overfishing:
Even when management sets harvest quotas that could maximize profits, the
incentives of the individual harvester are typically inconsistent with profit
maximization for the fleet. Because individuals lack secure rights to part of the
quota, they have a perverse motivation to “race to fish” to outcompete others.
This race can lead to poor stewardship and lobbying for ever-larger harvest
quotas, creating a spiral of reduced stocks, excessive harvests, and eventual
collapse. (Costello et al., 2008, p.1679)

This logic forms the foundation of rights-based management: ownership promotes
stewardship.
Common-Pool Resource: The Fishery
Rhode Island’s marine fisheries are common-pool resources. The term
“common-pool resources” (CPR) refers to, “a class of resources for which exclusion is
difficult and joint use involves subtractability” (Berkes et al., 1989, p. 91). The control
of access – or excludability – is difficult because CPR systems are “sufficiently large
as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from
obtaining benefits from its use” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 30). Subtractability refers to the
idea that “each user is capable of subtracting from the welfare of other users” (Feeny
et al. 1990, 78). In fisheries, this means that, “if one user harvests fish, the catch per
unit of fishing effort of other fishermen declines” (Feeny et al., 1990, 78).
References to the perceived ‘problem’ of open access abound in natural
resource literature (Hardin, 1968; see also Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955). In his 1968
article that appeared in the journal Science, Hardin describes a, “pasture that is open to
9

all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible
on the commons” (1968, p. 1244). Hardin goes on to say that, “Each man is locked
into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world that is
limited...Freedom of the commons brings ruin to all” (Hardin, 1969, p. 1244).
However, Hanna points out that Hardin’s (1968) reference to “freedom of the
commons,” never really existed: “The commons was community property subject to
community control” (Hanna, 1990, p.159). Rather than the “free-for-all…rights to the
common fields, pasture, or woodland took many forms and were associated with both
ownership of land and with the person” (Hanna, 1990, p. 159-160). Feeny et al. write
that “Hardin has been widely cited as having said resource degradation was inevitable
unless common property was converted into private property, or government
regulation of uses and user was instituted” (1990, p.77). Despite the emergence of a
body of literature that effectively counters Hardin’s claims (Dietz et al., 2002; Hanna,
1990), his argument continues to be upheld into the 21st century by prominent fisheries
scientists:
Hardin (1968) described a system of governance, the commons, in which
individuals maximize their own welfare by a series of decisions that result in
overexploitation (the ‘tragedy of the commons’), a societally undesirable result.
It is now well established that a similar pattern has been repeated in the majority
of unregulated fisheries around the world. (Hilborn et al., 2005, p.47)

Indeed, fifteen years after Elinor Ostrom argued in Governing the Commons (1990)
that natural resources can be successfully managed through collective action without
private property or government regulation, fisheries literature continues to suggest that
a lack property in the ‘commons’ results in ‘tragedy’.
Members of the academic community have noted that the terms “commonproperty” and “common-pool resources” and “open access” have been used
10

interchangeably (Bromley, 1989; Feeny et al. 1990, Hanna, 1990). For clarity, this
research seeks to differentiate between these terms, and supposes that commonproperty is one of a series of resource regimes that may be used to manage CPRs.
Resource Regimes of Common-Pool Resources
Achieving socially and biologically desirable outcomes through the
management of marine fisheries is inextricably linked to the resource regimes society
creates. Bromley defines a resource regime as, “a structure of rights and duties
characterizing the relationships of individuals to one another with respect to that
particular [marine] resource” (Bromley, 1989: 5). That is, the type of property regime
that is employed will effectively allow, limit, or block new entry into the fishery based
on the characteristics of the structure of the resource regime. In this thesis, four types
of resource regimes are considered in Table 1: private property, state property,
common property, and open-access (Bromley and Cernea, 1989):
Table 1. Common-Pool Resource Property Regimes
Resource
Regime
State Property
Private Property

Common
Property
Open Access

Definition
“Ownership and control over use rests in the hands of the state.
Individuals and groups may be able to make use of the
resources, but only at the forbearance of the state.” (11).
“Private property regimes appear to be stable to and adaptive
because they have social and legal sanction to exclude excess
population, and effectively resist – through the power of the
state – unwanted intrusions” (13).
“Individuals have rights and obligations in situations of
common (non-individual) property, just as in private
individual property situations” (14).
“The situation in which there is no property [such that]
‘everybody’s access is nobody’s property’” (19).
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Under federal and state law the marine resources occurring within three nautical miles
of the Rhode Island coast and Block Island are considered state property. However,
common-property resource regimes are of particular interest to this thesis because of
the structure of the state’s catch share program in that state property regime and the
feasibility of nesting one resource regime within another.
Regulatory institutions (read State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations)
can create a hierarchy of resource regimes. In practice, the Rhode Island Fluke Sector
operated with common-property characteristics under the umbrella of state property.1
If the state can effectively enforce multiple resource regimes, the design of
management programs can accommodate new entry and catch shares programs. At
question for this thesis is whether or not the legislature intended for the resource to be
managed as both common property and state property.
For Whom Shall We Manage?
Fisheries management is an exercise in social engineering. With regard to the
goals of managing a fishery sustainably, Gordon notes that, “the economic optimum in
not necessarily the human optimum. Under certain circumstances we may well prefer
to have an economically ‘inefficient’ fishery if the other effects of organizing the
fishery along economically optimum lines are politically difficult or socially
undesirable” (Gordon, 1953, p.443).
Recognizing that OAY creates economic waste in the fisheries, economists
have advocated for varying forms of property rights in fisheries (Gordon, 1954; Scott,

1	
  The

Fluke sector’s membership does not enjoy legal ownership (a defendable claim)
over an allocation of the state’s coast wide summer flounder quota prior to the capture
those animals.	
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1955; A. Scott, 1989; Costello and Deacon, 2007). While Scott (1955) advocates for
sole ownership, Gordon (1954) makes the case for private or state regulation of the
ocean commons in the following way: “Common-property2 natural resources are free
goods for the individual and scarce goods for society. Under unregulated private
exploitation, they can yield no rent; that can be accomplished only by methods which
make them private property or public (government) property, in either case subject to
a unified directing power (Gordon, 1954, p.135). Similarly, the rationale for limited
entry in fisheries is rooted in the notion that open-access to a CPR will yield economic
inefficiencies, the overexploitation of the resource, or both (Gordon 1954, Scott 1955,
Schaefer 1957, Hardin 1968). To understand the significance of shifting to a catch
share approach in Rhode Island’s state fisheries, we must first explore the history of
fishing in the Ocean State, as well as the legal decisions that have shaped it.
Federalism and Fisheries Management
Ecosystem boundaries do not match political boundaries. Rather, the same
animal may be continually transiting in and out of multiple jurisdictions and
management areas. Despite this disconnect, the imperative for managing marine
fisheries is rooted in the fact that fish swimming within the United State’s Exclusive
Economic Zone are, “the property of U.S. citizens” (Macinko and Bromley, 2002,
p.7). Moreover, marine resources occurring within the territorial seas of Rhode Island
are controlled by the state.
The management of Rhode Island’s territorial waters, as separate and distinct
from federal waters, or those of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York, is rooted
2	
  In	
  this	
  thesis,	
  Gordon’s	
  use	
  of	
  “common-‐property”	
  can	
  be	
  understood	
  as	
  “open	
  access”	
  

as	
  defined	
  by	
  Bromley	
  and	
  Cerna	
  (1989).	
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in federalism. As a consequence, both individual states and the federal government
wield the ability to determine access to fisheries resources. This separation of power
is rooted in the work of James Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton in the
Federalist Papers. Federalist No. 9, in which Alexander Hamilton writes that:
The proposed constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the state
governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by
allowing them direct representation in the senate, and leave in their possession
certain exclusive, and very important, portions of the sovereign power. This
corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of federal
government (Hamilton et al., in Carey and McClellan, 2001, p.41).

This sovereign power of states to control marine resources in their territorial waters
was recognized by Congress through the Rights of States provisions of the Submerged
Lands Act of 1953 (43 U.S.C. § 1311).
The Submerged Lands Act provides an important regulative dimension to
Rhode Island’s fisheries because it “recognizes that States have title or ownership
interest in the fish swimming in their territorial waters” (Kalo et al., 2002, p.621).
Prior to the passing of the Submerged Lands Act, the power of states to regulate
fisheries in their jurisdictional waters had been well documented in case law. In
Manchester v. Massachusetts (139 U.S. 240 (1891)), the Supreme Court upheld
Massachusetts’ restrictions on fishing for menhaden with purse seine in Buzzards Bay,
stating:
The right of control exists in the State in the absence of the affirmative action of
Congress taking such control, the fact that Congress has never assumed the control of
such fisheries is persuasive evidence that the right to control them still remains in the
State (139 U.S. 240 (1891)).

The rulings in Manchester (139 U.S. 240) underscores Rhode Island’s ability to
manage species within state waters.
Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act
14

As a member of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC),
Rhode Island participates in the collective management of the summer flounder
resource with other coastal states, and the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council.
Under the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act (ACFCMA) of
1993, Rhode Island is bound by federal law to implement and enforce conservation
and management measures for state waters fisheries that are consistent with federal
law (16 U.S.C. Chapter 71 § 5101 - 5108). After the passage of the passage of the
ACFCMA, states were given one year to implement coastal fishery management
plans, or face a non-compliance finding from the ASMFC. If Rhode Island was
determined to be out of compliance with the mandates of ACFCMA at any time, the
state could face severe sanctions from the Secretary of Commerce, including a
moratorium on fishing in the state:
Upon making a finding under subsection (a) of this section that a State has failed
to carry out its responsibility under section 5014 of this title and that the
measures it failed to implement and enforce are necessary for conservation, the
Secretary shall declare a moratorium on fishing in the fishery in question within
the waters of the noncomplying State. The Secretary shall specify the
moratorium's effective date, which shall be any date within 6 months after
declaration of the moratorium. (16 U.S.C. Chapter 71 § 5106(c)(1))

The threat of top-down federal control within the jurisdiction of the state raised the
stakes for achieving conservation of fisheries resources in state waters in Rhode Island
– and up and down the east coast.
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CHAPTER 3: FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN RHODE ISLAND
Early History of Rhode Island’s fishery
For centuries, the people of Rhode Island enjoyed unfettered access to marine
fisheries resources. Historians have speculated that a right of fishery in Rhode Island
may have been established as early as 1639 by a general assembly of freemen in
Newport: “At the expiration of the six weeks from the time the corn was divided, all
the sea banks were declared free for fishing, but whether in consequence of the
scarcity of provisions, or as a simple matter of public right, is not stated– probably the
latter” (Arnold, 1859, p.142-143). The result of the assembly’s vote was that, “Equal
freedom was thus granted to all inhabitants of the colony to fish in the waters of the
bay and this right was perpetuated and extended to include the shores likewise by the
King Charles Charter of 1663 (Field, 1902, p. 393). The King Charles Charter of 1663
explicitly recognizes a right of fishery for the King’s subjects, stating:
Provided also, and our express will and pleasure is, and we do, by these
presents, for us, our heirs and successors, ordain and appoint that these
presents, shall not, in any manner, hinder any of our loving subjects,
whatsoever, from using and exercising the trade of fishing upon the coast of
New England, in America; but that they, and every or any of them, shall have
full and free power and liberty to continue and use the trade of fishing upon
the said coast, in any of the seas thereunto adjoining, or any arms of the seas,
or salt water, rivers and creeks, where they have been accustomed to fish; and
to build and set upon the waste land belonging to the said Colony and
Plantations, such wharves, stages and workhouses as shall be necessary for
the salting, drying and keeping of their fish, to be taken or gotten upon that
coast (King Charles II, Retrieved April 25th, 2011 from
http://sos.ri.gov/library/history/charter/).

Scholars have aptly noted that the Charter provides for the right of fishery to the
king’s loving subjects in America – not just Rhode Island, and that the Charter applies
to finfish, not shellfish (Nixon, 2001).
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Article 17 of the Rhode Island Constitution
For nearly 180 years - from 1663 to 1843 - the people of Rhode Island were governed
under the Charter, and enjoyed open access to its marine resources. The “People’s
Constitution,” originally adopted in 1843, codified the right of fishery in Article 1,
Section 17, which originally read:
The people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all the rights of fishery,
and the privileges of the shore to which they have been heretofore entitled under
the charter and usages of the State. But no new right is intended to be granted,
nor any existing right impaired, by this declaration (quoted in Nixon, 2001, p.3
see also: http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/RiConstitution/).

Later, the section was, “subsequently amended to further define the term ‘privileges of
the shore,’ but the key phrase ‘rights of fishery...under the charter and usages of the
state’ remains unchanged” (Nixon, 2001, p.3). The inclusion of this provision in the
Rhode Island Constitution is significant because constitutions generally define:
The organic and fundamental law of a nation or state, which may be written or
unwritten, establishing the character and conception of Its government, laying the
basic principles to which its internal life is to be conformed, organizing the
government, and regulating, distributing, and limiting the functions of its
different departments, and prescribing the extent and manner of the exercise of
sovereign powers. (Black’s Online Law Dictionary, retrieved on 12/22/12).

By guaranteeing the right of fishery to the people of Rhode Island, this document
represents a regulatory institution in the state’s history that has influenced residents’
normative and cognitive frameworks. Residents’ expectation that they have an
inalienable right to access fisheries in the state is the product of socializing hundreds
of years of access.
Power and Duty of the General Assembly in Respect to Fisheries
While Article 17 recognizes resident’s interest in continued access to the
fishery, a reading of Rhode Island case law reveals that this constitutional guarantee is
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subject to the regulation of fisheries by the General Assembly. In Clark v. City of
Providence (16 R.I. 137 (1888)), the court found that the General Assembly’s approval
of a project to fill a cove that had been formally used for fishing was not
unconstitutional. Nixon writes of the Court’s decision: “They held, in one of the most
absolute statements of the General Assembly’s power, that ‘these rights of clamming
and fishing are enjoyed in subordination to the paramount authority of the General
Assembly to regulate and modify, and, to some extend at least, to extinguish them.’ A
more complete grant of unfettered authority is difficult to imagine” (quoting Clark v.
City of Providence, 2001, p.4). The 1910 case of Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas
Company (31 R.I. 295 (1910)), contesting the liability of the gas company in damages
to leased oyster beds again raised the question of the power of the General Assembly
in respect to fisheries. In Payne, the Providence Gas Company argued that is was not
liable for damages to the plaintiffs oyster beds caused by the company’s discharge of
waste oil into Narragansett Bay because the General Assembly’s lease statute was not
constitutional. Acknowledging the power of the General Assembly, the Court wrote:
Therefore the whole subject of fisheries, floating and shell-fish, and all kinds
of shell-fish, whether oysters, clams, quahaugs, mussels, scallops, lobsters,
crabs, or fiddlers, or however they may be known and designated and
wherever situate within the public domain of the State of Rhode Island, are
under the fostering care of the General Assembly. It is for the legislature to
make such laws, regulating and governing the subject of lobster-culture,
oyster-culture, clam-culture or any other kind of pisciculture, as they may
deem expedient. They may regulate the public or private fisheries. They may
even prohibit free fishing for a time and for such times as in their judgment it
is for the best interest, of the State so to do. They may withhold from the
public use such natural oyster beds, clam beds, scallop beds or other fish beds
as they may deem desirable. They may make a close time within which no
person may take shellfish or other fish, and generally they have complete
dominion over fisheries and fish as well as all kinds of game. We find no
limitation, in the constitution, of the power of the General Assembly to
legislate in this regard, and they may delegate the administration of their
regulations to such officers or boards as they may see
fit. (31 R.I. 295 (1910 ))
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The Payne case is relevant to this thesis because it tempers the constitutional guarantee
of the right of fishery with the power of the General Assembly to regulate the fishery
for the benefit of the people. Nixon writes that the Payne decision, “seemed to settle
the question until 1958, when the Rhode Island Senate requested an Advisory Opinion
from the Supreme Court related to the striped bass fishery” (2001, p.4).
In respect to the duty of the General Assembly – and the interests of the people
of Rhode Island – in the crafting of fisheries laws, the Court offers in its 1911 decision
of State v. Constantine Kofines et al. that this “common property [be treated] as a trust
for the benefit of the people, and not as prerogative for the advantage of government,
as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of private individuals as distinguished
from the public good” (33 R.I. 211 (1911).
In the Opinion to the Senate, the Court concluded that, “the power of the
legislature to regulate fisheries in the waters of this state is plenary” (87 R.I. 37
(1958)). As noted by Nixon: “Whether or not the state constitution provides any
impediment to the powers of the General Assembly to design whatever type of
licensing or management system they deem appropriate is quite clear: it does not”
(Nixon, 2001, p.5). With the management of Rhode Island’s marine resources held in
trust by the General Assembly, understanding the intent of legislation is central to
discerning if management plans are inconsistent with provisions of existing statute.
Equally important is the recognition that the will of the General Assembly in regard to
a particular means of management is subject to change – that theirs is a dynamic
process that builds upon prior experience and reflects on the interest of the people of
Rhode Island.
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Commercial Fishing Licensing Act of 2002
Prior to the passing of the 2002 Act, Rhode Island had relied upon a series of
moratoriums on commercial fishing licenses to control effort in the fishery. Beginning
in July of 1995, the GA enacted a three-year moratorium on the issuance of new
commercial fishing licenses and established several committees to advise and evaluate
marine licensing programs going forward. When the moratorium lapsed in 1998, 1090
new commercial licenses were issued by the DEM (Valliere and Murphy, 2001).
In July of 2000, against a backdrop of declining fish stocks and continued
entry into Rhode Island’s commercial fisheries, the GA enacted another moratorium
on the issuance of new commercial fishing licenses. Later that year, Governor Lincoln
Almond, “requested that the Coastal Institute at the University of Rhode Island serve
as a forum to identify and discuss a range of options for reforming the commercial
fishing licensing system in Rhode Island” (Petruny-Parker et al., 2002, p.141). As part
of a the collective effort to examine licensing in the Ocean State, the General
Assembly passed the Marine Fisheries Management Modernization Act of 2001,
which directed the DEM to, “undertake studies and analyses that shall evaluate the full
reasonable range of options for improving fisheries management in Rhode Island”
[RIGL 20-3.1-7 (2001)]. The statute stipulated that, “The Department shall, by
October 1, 2001, recommend goals and principles to guide the development and
implementation of a restructured marine fisheries management system,” and that, “The
department shall, by January 1, 2002, recommend options for commercial fishing
licenses that address license eligibility, provide for new entrants into fisheries in the
state” [RIGL 20.3.1-7.1-2 (2001)]. These legislative mandates were implemented
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through the collaborative efforts of DEM, the Coastal Institute, and Intergovernmental
Working Group (IWG) on Fisheries Management.
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Throughout 2001 the Coastal Institute hosted series of stakeholder events,
before submitting a report to the IWG in December. Drawing on the work of the CI,
on February 7th, 2002, Senators Sosnowski, McDonald, Walaska, Bates, and Felag
introduced Senate Bill 2771, An Act Relating to Fish and Wildlife. The bill was then
referred to the Joint Committee of Environment and Energy. On May 31st, 2002,
Senate Bill 2771 substitute A moved to the floor of the Senate, where it passed by a
vote of 46-0. Four days later the legislation was voted on in the House of
Representatives, where is passed on a vote of 79-0. Without a single elected official
casting their vote in opposition, it is clear that the GA was satisfied with provisions
laid out in the Act.
Developing a Licensing Program
After the bill was passed, the DEM was charged with implementing the
provisions of the Act for the 2003 fishing year. The Coastal Institute process yields a
long list of licensing system objectives, which sparked debated over how to “ensure
the long term health of the commercial fish stocks” while “ensur[ing] fair access to the
industry and resources to everyone now and in the future” and “the economic health of
the industry” (August and Parker, 2001, p.6). In regard to new entry, “Maintaining
some degree of flexibility for fishermen to move laterally between fishing sectors, and
providing opportunity for ‘new blood’ to move into the fishing industry as other
fishermen retire, were identified as commonly held goals” (Petruny-Parker et al.,
2002, p.150).
While neighboring coastal states had limited entry into their commercial
fisheries, “Rhode Island has maintained a long tradition of allowing open access to
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the state’s marine fisheries resources for its residents, and at the time of the [2002
License Reform Act], it was only one of two coastal states nationwide to continue to
do so” (Petruny-Parker et al., 2002, p.138). The General Assembly’s adoption of the
Commercial Fishing Act of 2002 was a reflection of the state’s interest in continuing
to allow new entry into commercial fisheries by providing Rhode Island residents
open-access to entry-level commercial fishing licenses. The Act also stipulates that
new or replacement multi-purpose licenses (MPLs) and principle effort licenses
(PELs) be issued to qualifying residents when deemed appropriate by the Director of
RIDEM [RIGL 20-2.1 (2002)].
Licensing Structure created through 2002 Commercial Fishing Licensing Act
In response to the legislative mandates of the 2002 Act, in 2003 the DEM
adopted a new, tiered licensing program that includes three distinct license levels, and
a series of endorsements, which allow license holders to prosecute specific fisheries.
Rhode Island’s current commercial fisheries licensing program is composed of three
commercial harvesting licenses: the MPL, the PEL, and the commercial fishing license
(CFL). Fishermen who held commercial fishing licenses in fishing year 2000 were
granted MPLs, which allows that fisherman to harvest and land all marine species
managed by the state. No specific endorsements are needed, with the exception of
lobster. The next level of license is a PEL, which allows fishermen to harvest the full
quota of species for which the fisherman has the proper endorsement. Both MPLs and
PELs represent limited-access permits. The entry-level license is the commercial
fishing license (CFL), which is an open access license and allows fishermen to harvest
any non-restricted marine species at half of the state’s possession limit. Non-restricted
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finfish species include bluefish, menhaden, cod, and monkfish. Moreover, there are no
restrictions on the type of gear employed by the holder of a CFL with the exception of
gillnets and dredges. Practically, this means that any person who wishes to begin
commercial fishing may do so with a hand-line, long-ling, or otter-trawl.
The state offers eight different endorsements, which may be attached to CFL
and PEL licenses. Each endorsement confers access to a specific fishery for which
harvest is otherwise prohibited for the license holder. Endorsements include lobster,
non-lobster crustacean, quahaug, soft-shell clam, shellfish other (for access to all
shellfish species except quahaugs and soft-shell clams), restricted finfish, nonrestricted finfish, and whelk (RI Commercial and Recreational Saltwater Fishing
Licensing Regulations, 6.1-1).
Entry-Exit Ratio
Entry into the fishery can occur through upgrading of an existing license.
Therefore, new entry provisions of RIGL 20.2-1 are partially manifested in an
entry/exit ratio which meters in endorsements upon the retirement or lapse of existing
ones. DEM regulations allow fishermen who have at least 75 landings in a two-year
period the opportunity to add endorsements through a lottery system and entry/exit
ratio. In essence, only individuals who are active in the fishery can upgrade their
license. In 2009, the DEM began upgrading the license level (CFL to PEL) with the
addition of a restricted finfish endorsement. For restricted finfish, there are three
qualifying criteria:
First priority in the issuance of new licenses with applicable
endorsement(s) shall be given to (i) licensed resident fishers holding
Commercial Fishing Licenses, endorsed in the same fishery sector
(see section 5.31) for which a new license/ endorsement is being
sought, who have been actively fishing that endorsement, (ii)
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licensed resident fishers holding Principal Effort Licenses who have
been actively fishing their license, and (iii) resident crew members
who have been actively participating in the same fishery sector for
which a new license/endorsement is being sought. One-third of the
total number of new licenses with applicable endorsements will be
made available to each of the three priority categories. (Commercial and
Recreational Saltwater Fishing Licensing Regulations, 6.7-6(a), accessed
12/28/12))

Each year, the state’s Industry Advisory Committee (IAC) reviews licensing
data for the prior fishing year, and evaluates the state of the resource, and how many
fishing licenses were retired (i.e. not renewed). The IAC then determines and
entry/exit ratio of how many licenses were retired to how many new PELs with
restricted endorsements will be issued. Based on the IAC’s decisions, a fishing license
lottery is held, and new licenses and endorsements are awarded to active participants
in the fishery. In this way, new entry is metered into limited-access fisheries. In recent
years, the IAC has recommended that the exit/entry ratio focus on lapsed licenses with
fishing activity in the prior year. DEM licensing regulations codified this practice in
section 6.1-10 of the RI Commercial and Recreational Saltwater Fishing Licensing
Regulations. Table 2 shows the number of retired and new3 PEL licenses with RFF
endorsements issued through the entry-exit process over the last 9 years. A ratio of the
total number of retired (MPL and REL with RFF licenses with and without landings
history) is shown in the far right column:
Table 2: Issuance of RFF Endorsements through Entry-Exit Ratio: 2003-2012
Year	
  
2012	
  

New	
  RFF	
  
Endorsements	
  
6	
  

2011	
  

3	
  

Ratio	
  
3.33:1	
  	
  
(1:1	
  w/	
  activity)	
  
5:1	
  
(1:1	
  w/	
  activity	
  

3	
  Technically,	
  CFL	
  licenses	
  are	
  upgraded	
  to	
  MPL	
  licenses	
  through	
  the	
  exit/entry.	
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2010	
  
3	
  
n/a	
  
2009	
  
3	
  
n/a	
  
2008	
  
3	
  
n/a	
  
2007	
  
0	
  
n/a	
  
2006	
  
0	
  
n/a	
  
2005	
  
13	
  
n/a	
  
2004	
  
0	
  
n/a	
  
2003	
  
9	
  
n/a	
  
Source: IAC meeting minutes from 8/9/11, 7/20/10, and 7/21/09, accessed at
http://www.dem.ri.gov/programs/bnatres/fishwild/mfapidx.htm
Riley v. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management
The most recent court case to shape the management of fisheries in Rhode
Island was Riley v. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (941
A.2d 198, 206 (2008)), in which the plaintiff filed suit against DEM for denying a
limited-access permit to harvest restricted finfish, arguing that his constitutional right
to the fishery had been violated. While the Court found in favor DEM, the case
illustrates a prevailing cultural value of commercial access to the fishery in the state.
In Riley, the existence of a constitutional provision for the right of fishery in the state
effectively shaped the plaintiffs expectations of what is guaranteed to all Rhode Island
residents. In this way, Riley’s “shared definition of social reality,” (Scott, 1995, p.40)
led him to believe that all Rhode Island residents should be treated equally as
commercial fishermen fishing in state waters. While the Court in Riley found that
some level of access – not necessarily equal access to all species – satisfied
constitutional requirements, the prevailing cognitive and normative institutions that
legitimize open access to the fishery represent a challenge to the globalized ideals of
rights-based management.
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Management of the Summer Flounder Fishery
The summer flounder “fishery plan is intended to be the equivalent of the
fishery management plans produced by the regional councils for the exclusive
economic zone” (Nixon, 2001, p.7) Rhode Island’s management plan accounts for
total mortality – i.e. natural mortality and fishing mortality – in summer flounder
fishery by apportioning the state’s share of the coast wide quota across a series of subperiods, assigning trip or aggregate landing limits, and closing the fishery when the
total allowable catch had been harvested. With Rhode Island managing for total
mortality before the implementation of the sector, the pilot program represents a shift
in approach to quota management, within the context of limited entry.
Catch Shares: Rhode Island’s Summer Flounder Sector Pilot Program
In 2009, at the Direction of DEM Director Michael Sullivan, eight Rhode
Island commercial fishing vessels began participating in the state’s first catch share
program – the RI Summer Flounder Sector Allocation Pilot Program (Final Report on
the 2009 Sector Allocation Pilot Program, 2010). In December of 2008, after
considering a proposal to create a sector pilot program, the Rhode Island Marine
Fisheries Council, moved to postpone the consideration of the program for one year by
a vote of 4 – 3:
M Gibson called a vote on the motion to recommend to the Director that any
consideration of a sector allocation for summer flounder be postponed for one
year, but with continued discussions about the issue. The Council voted (4) four
in favor to postpone (S. Medeiros, S. Parente, S. Macinko, R. Hittinger) (3) three
opposed (J. King, D. Preble, C. Anderson), the motion to postpone for one year
passed. (Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council Meeting Minutes, December 1,
2008).

Though the Marine Fisheries Council narrowly recommended that the Director
postpone the program, after over a month of deliberation, he decided to move forward
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and pursue the pilot. In a memorandum to DEM Acting Chief Mark Gibson dated
January 25th, 2009, Director Sullivan stated that:
I am hereby announcing my decision to move forward with a modified version of
the pilot program. I recognize that there was considerable opposition to the
proposal expressed at hearing. And I further recognize that on a 4-3 vote, the
Council recommended postponing implementation of the program for at least one
year. I deeply respect the perspectives and concerns offered by the public and the
position taken by the Council. This was, and is, a very challenging issue, and I
know that a lot of people put a lot of time and thought into the review process.
Indeed, the record furnished many useful insights into how the proposal could be
modified to better meet the broad interests of the State’s fishermen and the public
as a whole. (Sullivan, 2009, p.1)

Director Sullivan continued on to provide statutory guidance and support for his
decision, which is of particular interest to this research. As part of his rationale in
approving the sector program, Sullivan references the legislative process undertaken
by the General Assembly that is the focus of this thesis:
In 2002, the RI General Assembly took a hard look at RI’s programs for marine
fisheries management and found that they “need[ed] to be brought up-to-date and
made adaptable to changing conditions and circumstances.” (RIGL 20-2.1-1(7))
In a clear expression of legislative policy and intent, DEM was charged with
“establish[ing] principles, for a system of adaptive management, that shall be
used by the department in licensure programs and fisheries management.” (RIGL
20-2.1-2(6)) DEM responded by promulgating regulations that included a firstever codification of the term “adaptive management” in state rule: “A formal
process for continually improving management policies and practices by learning
from their outcomes. As applied to marine fisheries management in Rhode
Island, this process will be characterized by rigorous and ongoing analysis of
stakeholder values and objectives regarding the fisheries; explicit recognition of
uncertainty in the decision-making process; where feasible, modeling of
management options and testing of models prior to significant management; and
direct feedback between management initiatives or practices and policy
development. (RIDEM, Rules and Regulations Governing the Management of
Marine Fisheries, Rule 5.3) I view the proposed sector allocation pilot program
as a vivid illustration of what the General Assembly had in mind when it called
upon DEM to modernize the State’s management programs via an adaptive
approach. The pilot program is designed to test the viability of a rights-based,
catch-share approach to management, an approach that is increasingly being
viewed as a promising solution to the vexing problems associated with traditional
fisheries governance. (Sullivan, 2009, p.2)

While the aim of this research is to more precisely understand what the General
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Assembly intended in achieve through the Act, Director Sullivan’s interpretation
is an illustration of institutional linkages at work in Rhode Island in 2008.
In approving the sector pilot program, the DEM also established a control
date of December 31, 2009:
As previously noted, the intent of the experimental pilot program is to see if it is
workable and beneficial to the overall fishery, in whole or part. I am therefore
committed to moving forward not only with the pilot program, but also with the
simultaneous development of a broader-based sector allocation program for a
larger segment of the fishery, if not the fishery in its entirety. If a broader based
program does emerge as a viable proposal, it might draw upon the historical
landings of individual sector participants as a primary basis for establishing
individual sector allocations. In view of the importance of giving all relevant
license holders advance notice of such a possibility and, by so doing, to enable all
such license holders to engage or increase participation in the summer flounder
fishery during 2009 to possibly better position themselves for participation in a
sector allocation program in 2010, if one is adopted, I hereby declare my intent to
establish a prospective control date of December 31, 2009 for the commercial
summer flounder fishery. (Sullivan, 2009, pp.6-7)

The control date is relevant to this thesis because it captures the DEM’s intent
pursue a broader program in the future, and how access for participation in the
fluke program may be constructed. The Rhode Island Department of
Environmental Management’s Commercial and Recreational Saltwater Fishing
Licensing Regulations define control date in section 5.17 as, “A cut off date for
potential use in establishing eligibility criteria for future access to a fishery”
(2012).
The pilot program was created in regulation as a research set-aside, and
evaluated by three criteria: “the economic performance of the sector, safety at sea,
and benefits to the resource” (Final Report on the 2009 Sector Allocation Pilot
Program, 2010, p.4). Sector participants are assigned a percentage of the state’s
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annual allocation based on their landings history from 2004 - 2008. The sector’s
allocation is the aggregate of each person’s percentage of the state quota, or what
is commonly referred to in the New England groundfish fishery as one’s
“potential sector contribution.” This allocation is to the collective, not any one
individual. In practice, the expectation is that individuals will either be able to
harvest the amount of summer flounder they bring to the sector, or lease their
contribution to other members of the sector. In this system, a license and quota
are required to access the summer flounder fishery.
The continuation of the Summer Flounder sector pilot program in fishing
years 2010 and 2011 underscored Rhode Island’s continued interest in pursuing
other forms of limited entry in the management of the state’s marine fisheries. It
is an appropriate time to revisit the legislative intent of RIGL 20-2.1 as it pertains
to access because the pilot program marks an institutional shift in how access to
the fishery is constructed.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The management of natural resources can be complex and nuanced and, as
illustrated in Chapter 2, fisheries are no exception. A review of foundational fisheries
literature on population dynamics, bio-economics, property regimes, and governance
framed the context in which political and management decisions are made. In that
Chapter, I suggest in the spirit of Schaefer (1959) that fisheries can be managed
sustainably though a suite of divergent management objectives such as MEY, MSY,
and OAY, depending on what society deems to be most desirable.
In Chapter 3, this research examines the history of Rhode Island’s fisheries
through a review of historical accounts, and case law. Later, I illustrate the processes
leading up to the passing of the Act, and address how the state operationalized its new
licensing program in 2002, and a catch share pilot program that began in 2009. This
background discussion outlines the research situation, but does not capture the
dimensions of the stakeholder processes or perceptions that form the intent of RIGL
20-2.1.
To understand the how individuals involved in the CI process and/or the
authoring of the legislation perceived the intent of RIGL 20-2.1, I conducted a total of
eight semi-structured open-ended interviews. In this chapter I discuss the qualitative
research methods in detail, with a specific focus on how responses to interview
questions were analyzed. With the background outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, these
interviews form the basis of the legislative intent of RIGL 20-2.1, and provide insight
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into current thinking around access and catch shares. Figure 2 captures the chronology
of research process, from data sampling to the development of grounded theory and
discussion of institutional linkages:
Figure 2. Chronology of Research Methodology
Ini$al*inquiry*to*RI*State*Senate*
NonSprobability*snowball*sampling*
Interviews*
Verba$m*Transcripts*
LineSbySLine*Coding*
Development*of*Code*Book*
Coding*of*ScoI’s*Ins$tu$onal*Pillars*
In*vivo*

First*Cycle*Coding*Processes*

Ini$al*

Second*Cycle*Coding*Processes*(Coding*of*Categories)*
Focused*
Axial*
Development*of*Construc$vist*Grounded*Theory*(ScoI,*1995)*
Ins$tu$onal*Linkages*(Young,*1996)*and*Nested*Rules*(Ostrom,*1990)*
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Qualitative Research Method: Grounded Theory
The qualitative method of Grounded Theory was used to explore the legislative
intent of the 2002 Commercial Fishing Licenses Act (Glaser and Strauss, 1967;
Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Charmaz, 2006). With a research objective of discerning
the intent of legislation that drew upon an extensive public process convened by the
Coastal Institute, this qualitative research design allowed for a full range of
perceptions and nuances to emerge from the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In this
way, grounded theory facilitated an understanding of the research situation itself, in
addition to testing the research hypothesis (Rogge et al., 2011). Primary data was
collected through open-ended semi-structured interviews. Peer-reviewed papers,
reports, and meeting minutes were complied and reviewed as secondary data sources.
Grounded theory has been applied in peer-reviewed research on salient fisheries issues
such as catch-shares and ecosystem-based management (Brewer, 2011).
Data Sampling
The intent of data sampling in grounded theory is to identify a discrete group
of participants that will help illuminate the problem posed by the research hypothesis
(Creswell, 1998). The specificity of the institutional knowledge sought in this research
suggested that a nonprobability sampling technique was appropriate. Snowball
sampling was used in the first round of data gathering because of its exploratory
nature and usefulness in finding, “members of a special population [that] are difficult
to locate” (Babbie, 1998, p.195). Snowball sampling, “refers to the process of
accumulation as each located subject suggests other subjects” (Babbie, 1998, p.195).
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This approach fosters the emergence of a “whole range of thematically relevant
positions in the population” (Rogge et al, 2011, p.335).
The sample began with an inquiry to State Senators who sponsored the Act,
and the Rhode Island Senate Policy Office on December 7th, 2010. While none of the
State Senators agreed to participate in the research – the snowball proceeded with
individuals who had participated in the Coastal Institute process that ultimately
informed the Act. The Senate Policy Office suggested two people for participation in
this research (110201_001 and 110204_004). Those individuals suggested a total of
four new individuals to interview, with one person being mentioned by each. From
there, the snowball began to approach saturation, the juncture in the sampling process
when no new individuals are identified (Charmaz, 2006). In total, eight semistructured interviews were derived from this sampling method, each ranging in length
from forty minutes to three hours. Figure 3 illustrates the progression of the snowball
sample from the Senate Policy Office to saturation. Arrows originate with the
respondent, and point to the individuals that they suggested. As the sample became
saturated, new respondents mentioned individuals who had already been interviewed.
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Figure 3. Progression of snowball sample
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The small sample size (n=8) at saturation of the snowball sampling method
indicates that the fisheries network in Rhode Island is small and closely knit. Even
those with diverging perspectives on how Rhode Island ought to manage its fisheries
suggested each other. Beginning the snowball with the Senate Policy Office appears
to have yielded a saturated sample of those who were intimately involved in the
Coastal Institute process and followed the bill through its passage in the General
Assembly. To be clear, a large number (n<8) of stakeholders participated in the
Coastal Institute process before legislation was introduced at the state house.
Interview Instrument:
The interview instrument used in this research contained thirteen total
questions. A copy of the interview can be found in Appendix II. Interview questions
focused on participant’s perception of the intent of the 2002 Commercial Fishing
Licenses Act, as well as their opinions on new entry into the state fishery. Question
one, and the four follow-up questions focused on perceptions of the General
Assembly’s intent of the 2002 Commercial Fishing Licensing Act. Question two
addresses perceptions around Rhode Island’s existing licensing structure, while
questions three and four addressed catch shares and tradable commodities. Questions
five and six addressed respondents’ current opinions on new entry and tradable
commodities in the Rhode Island state fishery. The decision to specify tradable
commodities in the interview was two-fold: State permitted commercial fishing
businesses can be bought and sold in Rhode Island, the structure of the Fluke pilot
program allows for the transferability of one member’s fluke contribution to another
member in the sector, and fluke sector landings data made available by DEM showed
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that sector members did not catch their exact contribution to the cooperative – some
caught more and some caught less (Final Report on the 2009 Sector Allocation Pilot
Program, 2010). Moreover, it seemed appropriate to focus on characteristics of the
catch share pilot program as currently structured rather than asking interviewees to
speak to catch shares broadly applied. The open-ended nature of the interview
instrument allowed research participants to say as much or as little they deemed
appropriate to answer each question.
Developing the codebook
In person interviews were recorded with the consent of each respondent. These
audio recordings were used to generate verbatim transcripts. Transcripts were coded
by hand, and then reviewed and recoded into an excel spreadsheet to form the
codebook. During this the first-cycle coding process, sections of in vivo text from the
transcripts were identified, and recorded wholesale into the codebook in a separate
column for potential use as quotations. As a separate process, each code was reviewed
and coded for the institutional pillar (regulative, normative, cognitive) that it most
closely represented. Once the codebook had been developed, first cycle (in vivo and
initial codes) were grouped into categories. Finally, a second tier of grounded theory
categories was generated as part of the second-cycle coding process.
Coding
Coding is a core process of grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006). For the
purposes of this study, “A code is most often a word or short phrase that symbolically
assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a
portion of language-based or visual data” (Saldaña, 2009, p.3). Unlike quantitative
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analyses that apply preconceived codes and categories to the data, the intent of
grounded theory is to allow codes to emerge and develop as the researcher begins
defining the data (Charmaz, 2006). In this way, “coding is not a precise science; it’s
primarily an interpretative act” (Saldaña, 2009, p.4). Coding qualitative data allows
the researcher to examine data critically and analytically, as separate from respondents
and their worldviews (Charmaz, 2006). For the purposes of this thesis, coding was
considered a process that helped to ensure objectivity throughout data collection and
analysis.
Coding was conducted in two cycles. In the first cycle, initial and in vivo
codes were developed. As will be described in further detail in the following
paragraphs, the fundamental difference between these approaches is that in vivo
coding uses respondents own language as the code, while initial coding is a method
that allows in which the researcher assigns the code. Initial and in vivo coding
approaches were employed simultaneously in the first cycle, as initial coding can
include elements of in vivo coding (Saldaña, 2009).
Methodologically, the process of initial coding is an essential piece of
grounded theory because it represents, “a starting point to provide the researcher with
analytic leads for further exploration” (Saldaña, 2009, p.81). Charmaz notes that
“during initial coding, the goal is to remain open to all possible theoretical directions
indicated by your reading of the data” (2006, p.46).
Similarly, in vivo coding allows the researcher to “keep the data rooted in the
participant’s own language” (Saldaña, 2009, p.6). This approach, “helps to preserve
participants’ meanings of their views and actions in the coding itself” (Charmaz, 2006,
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p.55). For this study, in vivo coding represented a practical way to differentiate
between participant’s definitions of terms and phrases. By focusing on implicit
meanings through respondent’s own language, the in vivo coding process proved to be
a particularly useful in capturing the breadth of perceptions around fisheries
management. In vivo codes are differentiated from the researcher’s language in the
codebook by using quotation marks are the term or phrase. In some cases, these
coding approaches were combined into a single code to capture the context of the
response, as well as the respondents own language.
The coding process of grounded theory does not always pertain to individual
codes – the second cycle coding process often works with categories that are
developed through the first cycle of coding (Salanda, 2009). In this research, the
second cycle of coding consisted of focused and axial coding (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser
and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Saldaña notes that “Focused coding, as
a second cycle analytic process, is a streamlined adaptation of classic ground theory’s
Axial Coding” (2009, p.155). Focused coding was chosen as a second cycle coding
method because it allows for the comparison of emerging categories with pre-existing
categories, and fosters the formation of entirely new categories through continuous
analysis (Saldaña, 2009). In practice, this approach allows the researcher to “separate,
sort, and synthesize,” the data for further analysis (Charmaz, 2006, p.11). In the
analysis, focused coding was used to reorganize first cycle coding categories into a
streamlined set of second cycle categories that are referred to as grounded theory
categories in this thesis.
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Axial coding was employed in this research to understand the relationships
among and within grounded theory categories that emerged after second-cycle focused
coding. Axial coding allowed the researcher to specify the, “properties and dimensions
of a [major] category” while analyzing the data (Charmaz, 2006, p.60). Axial and
focused coding methods were used to refine categories for analysis, while constructing
a “dense texture of relationships around [major] categories” (Strauss, 1987, p.64).
Categories
Categories represent analytic ideas derived from the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).
In this research, categories were developed using analytic memos, as well as in vivo
and focused coding. The use of a rigorous coding process proved helpful in
identifying properties and dimensions of categories. To develop theory – and answer
the research hypothesis – the relationships between categories were diagramed as part
of axial coding, and then sorted as “a means of creating and refining theoretical links”
(Charmaz, 2006, p.115). This process yielded axial categories within the grounded
theory categories as shown in Figure 5 in Chapter 4.
Memos
In addition to coding the transcripts and secondary source data, analytic memos were
produced as part of the grounded theory methodology. Analytic memos reflect upon
ideas and categories that develop during the coding process, and serve as a
comparative method for theory development (Chamaz, 2006). Informal in nature,
memos were produced at all stages of data collection, and during subsequent analysis.
As the state of Rhode Island continues to explore catch shares in the state fishery,
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memo writing proved to be a useful way to apply relevant, real-time information to the
development of a grounded theory.
Theory
This research adopts a constructivist approach to grounded theory. With the
study’s research hypothesis examining the compatibility of catch shares in the fluke
fishery as structured within existing state law, a constructivist approach to theory
development is employed to learn “how, when, and to what extent the [legislative
intent of the 2002 Commercial Fishing Licenses Act] is embedded in
larger…networks, situations, and relationships” (Charmaz, 2006, p.130). Recognizing
that the grounded theory method allows theory to organically evolve, I felt that the
application of an institutional framework to the emerging theory would be a useful –
and meaningful – way to understand the evolution of fisheries management in Rhode
Island.
Institutional Analysis
Institutions provide stability and meaning to our social behavior. Generally
characterized as durable and robust, “institutions are as essential to fisheries as the fish
and fishers themselves” (Jentoft, 2004, p.138). While their importance to fisheries in
widely acknowledged (Acheson, 2003; Degnbol and McCay, 2007; Holm, 1995;
Jentoft, 2004; Ostrom, 1990), the social science literature is effectively devoid of a
commonly held definition of institutions (March and Olsen, 1989; Ostrom, 1990;
Scott, 1995). In the absence of academic consensus, the intent of the 2002 Commercial
Fishing Licensing Act is considered within W. Richard Scott’s institutional framework
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(1995). Additionally, institutional linkages (Young, 1996) are employed to frame
discussion around the interplay of fishery institutions.
Analytic Framework: Three Pillars of Institutions
Broadly applied, “Institutional frameworks define the ends and shape the means by
which interests are determined and pursued” (Scott, 1987, p.502). In his later work,
Scott further defines institutions as, “Cognitive, normative, and regulative structures
that provide stability and meaning to social behavior. Institutions are transported by
various carriers—cultures, structures, and routines—and they operate at multiple
levels of jurisdiction” (Scott, 1995, p.33). Scott’s analytic framework was applied to
this research as a means of understanding individual’s perceptions, values, and
worldviews as they relate to fisheries management in Rhode Island. Table 3 is
adapted from Scott (1995, p.35).
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Table 3. Varying Emphases: Three Pillars of Institutions
Three Institutional Pillars
Regulative

Normative

Cognitive

Basis of
legitimacy:

Legally
sanctioned

Morally governed

Culturally
supported,
conceptually
correct

Basis of
compliance:

Expedience

Social obligation

Taken for
granted

Indicators:

Rules, laws,
sanctions

Certification,
accreditation

Prevalence,
isomorphism

Logic:

Instrumentality

Appropriateness

Orthodoxy

Regulative elements of institutions “constrain and regularize behavior” of
individuals (Scott, 1995, p.35). Additionally, normative and cognitive structures round
out what Scott describes as the three pillars of institutions (1995). Normative pillars
focus on values and norms. While “values are conceptions of the preferred or the
desirable together with the construction of standards to which existing structures or
behavior can be compared and assessed…norms specify how things should be done;
they define legitimate means to pursue valued ends” (Scott, 1995, p.37). The cognitive
pillar focuses on “shared definitions of social reality,” (Scott, 1995, p.40). The
cognitive model also stipulates that, “the social construction of actors also defines
what they see as their interests” (Scott, 1995, p.43).
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Another element of institutional theory considered in this thesis is legitimacy.
Scott defines legitimacy as the, “condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative
support, or consonance with relevant rules or laws” (1995, p.45). Acknowledging that
participants may evaluate regulative, normative, and cognitive institutions differently,
legitimacy emerged as an important concept to consider in this research.
In addition to applying a grounded theory methodology to Scott’s institutional
pillars, this thesis explores the means by which institutions are transported in society.
Regulative, normative, and cognitive elements are embedded within carriers – the
cultures, social structures, and routines present in society (Scott, 1995). In analyzing
the data set, particular attention was paid to which elements of institutions the study’s
participants emphasized in their responses. Table 4 is adapted from Scott (1995, p.
52).
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Table 4. Institutional Pillars and Carriers
Pillar

Carrier

Regulative

Normative

Cognitive

Cultures

Rules, laws

Values,
expectations

Categories,
typifications

Social
structures

Governance
systems, power
systems

Regimes,
authority
systems

Structural
isomorphism

Institutional Approaches: Linkages and Nested Rules
Institutions in fisheries exist at varying levels of society (Jentoff, 2004). The concept
of institutional linkages – especially nesting – recognizes the interaction among
institutions, and the influence that each institution may have on another (Young,
1996). Young writes that, “All institutional linkages involve politically significant
connections between or among institutional arrangements that are differentiable in the
sense that they have distinct creation stories and ongoing lives of their own” (Young,
1996, p.2). Institutional nesting is defined as:
A matter of linkages in which specific arrangements restricted in terms of
functional scope, geographical domain, or some other relevant criterion
are folded into broader institutional frameworks that deal with the same
general issue area but that are less detailed in terms of their application to
a specific problem. (Young, 1996, p.4)
Of interest to this research is the interplay between regional, and global fisheries
institutions, as well as institutions in the Rhode Island state fishery. Analysis of
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institutional relationships is considered on a continuum, bookended by state fisheries
institutions and global fisheries institutions.
Limitations of this Method
As stated earlier in this chapter, the focused nature of the research question and
limited number of individuals who have first-hand knowledge of the development of
the 2002 Act called for a nonprobability sampling technique. By definition this means
that segments of the general public are not represented in this research. The decision to
begin the snow-ball sample with an inquiry to State Senators who sponsored the Act,
and the State Senate policy office was based on my own perception these individuals
would be able to direct me to provide me with the GA’s intent of the Act, and direct
me to individuals who participated in the development of the Act. While the State
Senators did not participate in this research, the sampling method generated a small but what I concluded to be an inclusive - sample of eight individuals based on the
repetition of names through the snowball method.
Moreover, the analysis and results chapter focuses on each individual’s
perceptions about what the General Assembly sought to accomplish through the 2002,
and how those intents comport with the evolution of fisheries management in Rhode
Island. These interviews were conducted in early 2011, and therefore may not capture
the respondents thinking at the time of writing.
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS
Application of Institutional Pillars
Scott’s institutional pillars were applied as an analytic framework in the second cycle
of coding (focused coding) as a means of understanding perceptions of fisheries
management in Rhode Island. Institutional pillars were used to categorize the in vivo
– or natural language – codes generated from verbatim transcripts. In doing so, codes
were categorized as regulative if they related to rules, laws, governing bodies, or
pertained to the policy process itself. Similarly, codes were considered normative if
they captured opinions, values, norms, or alluded to social obligations. Finally, codes
were interpreted as cognitive if they represented how individual’s worldviews, or
denoted the frames of reference through which meaning is made (Scott, 1995).
Despite being referred to as institutional pillars, this analytic framework is fluid in
nature as worldviews may influence values and vice versa, all of which can be
constrained by regulations. Moreover, single concepts that emerged from the coding
process could be categorized as any one of the pillars, depending on the context. For
example, the following table is meant to illustrate how context is used in coding. The
examples in Table 5 refer to discussion on “new entry”:
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Table 5: Interpreting Context in Coding For Institutions
Code	
  

Institutional Pillar	
  

“Moratorium on new entry”	
  

Regulative	
  

“Should not allow new entry into
fisheries”	
  
“Rhode Island had always
accommodated new entry”	
  

Normative	
  
Cognitive 	
  

As previously noted in the methodology chapter, coding is an “interpretative process”
(Salanda, 2009, 4). In this thesis the grounded theory methodology is employed to
illuminate the entire research situation around new entry and catch shares in Rhode
Island. Therefore, the written analysis of this thesis will include the full range of
perspectives offered on the topic, irrespective of frequency of mention. While
grounded theory is a decidedly qualitative approach to social science research, the
following descriptive statistics are meant to capture my coding process from interview
transcription to second-stage focused coding.
The first cycle coding process of the interview transcripts generated a total of
788 unique codes. To apply the grounded theory methodology to Scott’s institutional
framework, each in vivo and initial code was categorized as being regulative,
normative, or cognitive (n=772). The interview instrument contained two yes/no
questions (n=16 responses), which were not coded as part of the institutional
framework. This exercise identified 164 codes as regulative, 305 codes as normative,
and 303 codes as cognitive (Figure 4).
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Distribution of Codes: Scott's Institutional Pillars

Cognitive	
  
39%	
  

Regulative	
  
21%	
  
Normative	
  
40%	
  

Figure 4: Distribution of Codes Across Scott’s Institutional Pillars
In vivo and initial codes from the first cycle of coding were evaluated to
illustrate the number of codes that contained respondent’s own language. For this
process, a code that combines initial and in vivo codes (researcher’s language and
respondent’s language) is considered to be an in vivo code. Of the 772 codes
generated through the first cycle of coding, 716 (93%) are considered in vivo codes as
they contain interviewee’s natural language captured in verbatim transcripts. As noted
in the methodology chapter, these codes were grouped into categories in order to
capture issues that emerged from the coding process. Like the new entry example
above, several of the categories were crosscutting, emerging within multiple
institutional pillars. The categories that emerged during the first cycle of code are
listed in Table 6.
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Table 6. Initial (first-cycle) Categories

Initial Categories
Access
Commodities
Fisheries Management
Flexibility
Job Satisfaction
Limited Entry
Political and Regulatory Environment
Regulatory Process
Rhode Island Constitution
Rights-Based Management
Sustainability
After reviewing initial categories, it appeared that overlap existed between the twelve
categories, as some categories were broader is scope than others. For example, limited
entry is an element of access to the fishery. As part of the second-cycle coding
process these “first cycle codes [were] reorganized and reconfigured to eventually
develop a smaller and more select list of categories” (Saldana, 2009, p.149).
Therefore, the following first cycle categories were condensed: Rights-based
management and commodities were brought into fisheries management; job
satisfaction, limited-entry and Rhode Island Constitution were folded into the access
category (where they previously existed as a second-cycle focused and axial
categories); and regulatory process was incorporated into political and regulatory
environment (Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Grounded Theory Categories
Using initial categories to inform categories for the second cycle of coding
does not truncate the analysis in any way; rather, second cycle coding methods are
used to streamline the discussion portion of the analysis, allowing the researcher to
bring forward similar issues wholesale rather than piecemeal. The five grounded
theory categories form the broad universe in which the research hypothesis is
examined, while axial categories capture the essence and dimensions (See earlier
discussion in Chapter 3). Figure 6 captures the relationship between grounded theory
and intial categories, with institutional pillars.
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Figure 6. Grounded Theory and Axial Codes with Institutional Pillars
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Analytic Approaches
To answer the research hypotheses, data was analyzed in three ways. First,
codes from to each interview question were aggregated from all interviews to capture
the universe of responses to each question. At their most basic level, responses to
Question 1 of the survey instrument form the range of intents of the RIGL 20-2.1,
which is the first step in answering the research hypothesis. Said another way, there is
no way to know if new entry and catch shares are in conflict without knowing what
people think the legislature sought to accomplish with the bill itself. Second, the data
was analyzed using the grounded theory methodology to understand institutional
perspectives around fisheries management and explore the possibility of reconciling
the apparent conflict between new entry and catch share management. Finally, coded
responses were analyzed using institutional linkages (Young, 1996). Where in vivo
and initial codes are used in the analyses, the unique nine-digit identifier for each
interview participant (123456_789), and corresponding code number (1-788) is given
as a reference.
Analysis One: Determining the intent of the 2002 Commercial Fishing Licensing Act
Respondents were asked a series of questions about the intent of the 2002
Commercial Fishing Licensing Act (Appendix II). To explore the range of intents of
the Act, a cross-tabulation of categories and responses to Question 1 of the interview
instrument was performed. As categories were developed using in vivo – or natural
language codes - this proved to be a useful way to broadly capture intents of the Act
that relies on interviewee’s own language.
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To ensure that these categories were in fact reflected in the interview responses
and not created by the researcher in the coding process, each of the categories
appearing in the initial cross-tabulation was searched for within the codebook. As the
in vivo codebook is populated by the respondent’s own words, the filter function of
MS Excel was used to search for a keywords within the codebook. This exercise yields
all in vivo codes that contain the keyword. A search of the responses to Question 1 in
the codebook using focused categories as keywords yielded the following results, also
shown in Table 7: New Entry (n=24), Fishermen (n=18), Fisheries (n=16), Licenses
(n=12), Limited Entry (n=8), Constitution (n=5), Open Access (n=2), Quota (n=2),
Catch Shares (n=1), Commodities (n=1).4
Table 7. Keyword Search of Question 1
Keywords	
  
New	
  Entry	
  
Fishermen	
  
Fisheries	
  
Moratorium	
  
Licenses	
  
Limited	
  Entry	
  
Constitution	
  
Open	
  Access	
  
Quota	
  
Catch	
  Shares	
  
Commodities	
  

Number	
  of	
  codes	
  containing	
  
keyword	
  	
  	
  
24	
  
18	
  
16	
  
14	
  
12	
  
8	
  
5	
  
2	
  
2	
  
1	
  
1	
  

The results of the keyword search simply captures frequency mention for one question
(Question 1), and omit the context in which the phrase or word was used. This

4

It should be noted that participants began each interview having been briefed on the research questions
though an explanation on the signed consent form.
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exercise is therefore intended to cross-check the work of the research and illustrate the
range of responses to Question 1.
The variance in responses to Question 1 demonstrates that the Act intended to
accomplish a range of objectives. Of immediate interest to this portion of the analysis,
responses revealed that the General Assembly intended to address the moratorium on
new commercial fishing licenses and allow new entry into the state fishery. Five
interviewees (n=5) mentioned either “ending” or “lifting” the moratorium, and all
respondents mentioned new entry as something that the Act sought to address. As one
person noted:
The constitution doesn't necessarily guarantee everybody the right to exploit
the marine resources without control or limitation, but there is a certainly a
strong feeling in Rhode Island, as the Ocean State, that access to the resource,
the ability to become a fishermen, is something that should be accommodated,
and the General Laws should reflect that. (110201_001:65)

Another interviewee stated that the Act: "Mandate[s] that the Division of Fish and
Wildlife set up a structure to allow new entrants into the fishery” (110208_001:409).
These viewpoints are substantiated by language contained in DEM’s “2012
Management Plan for the Finfish Fishery Sector” which reads: “One purpose of the
[2002] Act was to enable new entrants into commercial fisheries; however, provisions
providing authority to limit access were included” (Rhode Island Department of
Environmental Management, 2011, p.4). This focused analysis affirms that
accommodating new entry was an intent of the General Assembly through the 2002
Commercial Fishing Licensing Act. To better understand if this goal can be reconciled
with catch share management, as structured in the sector pilot program, a grounded
theory approach is employed to analyze data collected through the survey instrument.
Analysis Two: Grounded Theory and Scott’s Institutional Framework
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For part two of the analysis, each grounded theory category (five) and their
subsequent axial codes are discussed within the context of Scott’s (1995) analytic
framework. This approach lends itself to understanding the research situation as a
whole, though particular attention is paid to new entry and catch shares. This portion
of the analysis focuses on answering how the concept of new entry was envisioned
through the CI process and by the General Assembly. Did the General Assembly
intend to address particular situations or issues that are not explicitly captured in the
bill itself? How do the other intents of the Act enable or constraint entry provisions? In
this section of the analysis, an attempt is made to parse out and unpack all elements of
fisheries institutions that emerged through this the interview process as a way to
answer the research hypothesis and address the practical policy implications of a shift
to catch share management. As part of this, I attempt to distinguish between
individual’s perceptions of institutions that informed the CI process in 2001, and their
personal values, beliefs, and worldviews at the time of interviews in 2011. As a shift
within limited entry to catch shares is fundamentally a policy decision, institutional
shifts captured in interview responses are mentioned to illustrate what might be
socially or politically acceptable going forward.
Political and Regulatory Environment
The responses forming the Political and Regulatory Environment category
capture regulative institutions present during the CI process. The category consists of
the laws, management regimes, and agencies mentioned by respondents. The mention
regulative institutions is relevant to theory development because it illuminates the
rules and laws that shaped what individuals thought was possible in during the CI
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process in 2001. Whether responses allude to the “King Charles Charter”
(110209_001:482, 110207_002:251) or the “DEM” (110204_004:162,
110217_001:780, 110209_002:478, 110216_001:583), the codes forming this category
represent the universe of regulative institutions that were present in Rhode Island
while the legislation was being developed. The Political and Regulatory Environment
is central to this discussion because the totality of regulative institutions in the Ocean
State ultimately “constrain and regularize behavior” within Rhode Island’s fisheries
(Scott, 1995, p.35). The category of the political and regulatory environment is
comprised of 132 codes pertaining to catch shares, limited entry, moratoriums, new
entry, the Rhode Island Constitution, and the regulatory process (Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Dimensions of Political and Regulatory Environment
The earliest regulative institution discussed during the interview process was
the “King Charles Charter of 1663” (110209_002:482). Other respondents mentioned
"Article 1, Section 17" (110208_001:365) of the Rhode Island Constitution, noting
"The General Assembly's mandate in the state constitution is to protect the natural
resources of the state" (110208_001:364). As discussed in Chapter 2, Rhode Island
was governed under the rules of King Charles Charter until the adoption of a
constitution in 1843. The discussion of these early regulative institutions is important
because it begins to explain why people felt that new entry could be included in the
Act. As covered earlier in the discussion of Riley vs. DEM, prior laws and rules
shaped what Riley thought was possible. In this way, culture as an institutional carrier
informs the how and why centuries old laws remain relevant individual’s thinking.
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Other regulative institutions that do not specifically apply to ideas of new entry
were also discussed. Six (n=6) interviewees mentioned “DEM” as the regulative
agency in the state, while two others spoke to the “Magnuson-Stevens Act”
(110209_002:458, 110204_004:85). The “Atlantic State’s Marine Fisheries
Commission” (110209_002:457) was also included noted. Regulative institutions are
not limited to laws or governing bodies, but can also included management regimes.
Interviewees spoke to multiple forms of limited entry, including license limitation
(n=7), and catch shares (n=5). Some shared a globalized perspective of fisheries, and
spoke to catch share systems in Australia, New Zealand, and Iceland (110204_004:91,
110217_001:757). Another respondent provided the specific example of “Alaskan
Limited Entry Program” (110207_002:220). In regulating behavior, these governance
systems shape what people perceive to be possible.
In regard to the development of the legislation, one respondent stated that the
"Coastal Institute [did] the policy development work” (110204_004:105), while
another stated that, “The legislature really doesn't know much about any of this stuff.
It is really a question of did the folks that took part in the license restructuring ever
think about it" (110207_002:311). Whether or not the General Assembly is well
versed in fisheries management, there was a feeling in 2001 that the licensing program
"had to be sorted out legislatively, it couldn't be sorted out by DEM"
(110209_002:478). This statement is significant because it indicates that particular
issues needed to be settled in law, not regulation.
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Access
During the coding process, the access category grew out of four initial
categories (access, job satisfaction, limited entry, and Rhode Island constitution).
Through axial coding, several more dimensions of access emerged from the codebook.
One-hundred and ninety-nine (n=199) codes form this category, ranging from open
access to catch shares as shown in Figure 8.

Grounded%Theory%
Category%

Access%
Catch%Shares%
Limited%Entry%
Moratorium%
New%Entry%

Axial%Codes%

Open%Access%
Part;<me/Full;<me%
Rhode%Island%Cons<tu<on%
Licenses%

Ins<tu<onal%%
Pillar(s)%

Norma<ve%and%Cogni<ve%

Figure 8. Dimensions of Access
In practice, the compatibility of new entry and catch shares hinges on how
access to the fishery is constructed. Devising a management program that reconciles
new entry and catch shares requires an understanding of the fisheries institutions and
carriers that inform each. Analysis of the codebook revealed that language pertaining
to access fit within Scott’s normative and cognitive institutional pillars. In this way,
the concepts of new entry and catch shares are different from the same topics (axial
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codes) within the regulative pillar (catch shares, limited entry, moratorium, new entry,
Rhode Island Constitution) because the values, expectations – and ultimately
worldviews – of individuals who were interviewed are not necessarily rooted in the
political and regulatory environment in Rhode Island in 2001. Instead, it became clear
that a wide range of other regimes and typifications – both past and present – informed
individual perspectives around access to the state fishery.
Among interviewees, it was widely acknowledged that the legislation
“Directed DEM to create a licensing system to allow individuals to enter [the fishery]”
(110208_001:353). However, responses differed on when access for new entrants was
to be allowed in the fishery. One respondent said that: “The act itself is trying to
establish a protocol to allow new entry into fisheries that are stressed"
(110217_001:747). In 2002, this entailed permitting additional entry into the lobster,
summer flounder, black sea bass, yellowtail flounder, monkfish, dogfish, tilefish, and
whiting fisheries, all of which were either overfished, and/or overfishing was
occurring (Valliere and Murphy, 2001). Another respondent suggested that the Act
sought, “To establish new entrants, but it does restrict their ability to, for primary
effort, to only one or two species" (110208_001:430).
As noted earlier in this Chapter, responses varied on how the Act intended for
the DEM to address access for new entrants after the expiration of the moratorium on
new licenses. One interviewee said that the General Assembly “wanted to relax [the
moratorium]” (110217_001:736). This speaks to the establishment of a license
limitation program which addresses the cognitive perception that: "We are all going to
go under if we don't try to control the floodgates of people coming in to be fishermen”
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(110204_004:123). The idea of “Relaxing” (110217_001:736) the moratorium seems
to suggest that the state (the General Assembly) was not ready to fully re-open the
doors to entry, and suggests the intent was to have a gradual shift toward a license
limitation program, with provisions for new entry built into a new limited entry
management scheme. There also appeared to be some apprehension around
speculation in the fishery: "I think the kind of mindset that guided the development of
the legislation was to try to keep the fisheries in that kind of access by the individual
and not making it attractive to the outside investors and things like that"
(110207_002:260). This response evokes preference to owner-operators and small
business. Even without an explicit linkage in the language, there appears to be an
assumption that closing the system and commodifying licenses through transferability
provisions in the management plan. Regulators ultimately addressed this concern, as
Rhode Island only permits the sale of an entire fishing business (Commercial and
Recreational Saltwater Fishing Licensing Regulations 6.7-8). This kind of thinking has
implications for how catch share programs and new entry can be reconciled, which is
taken up later in the policy recommendations.
Interviewees also discussed the political tension that existed between
recognizing the interests of existing fishermen and allowing for new entry into the
state fishery. With Rhode Island operating under a quota-based management regime
for summer flounder, the perception existed that new entry into the fishery may
compromise the viability of existing interests in the fishery as the new fishermen race
to catch the state’s total allowable catch. The idea of new entrants racing to fish is
more nuanced in the Rhode Island scenario than in “derby” (110204_004:116)
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fisheries in which harvesters remain in direct competition with one another until the
total allowable catch is landed. In actuality, “Priority was given to maintenance of a
full-time fishery. So, um, and, it recognized that to maintain that, you couldn't just
divide a limited level of total catch among an ever-expanding number of participants”
(110209_002:568). Applying the bio-economic rational discussed in Chapter 2, the
question becomes who gets to benefit from the resource? Limiting effort could
conceivably yield higher economic rent from the “limited level of total catch,” for
those with fishing limited-access licenses, while the “ever-expanding number of
participants” scenario would theoretically stop expanding when total cost equals total
revenue, at a theoretically sustainable level of harvest beyond MSY. In the above
statement, and RIGL 20.2-1, it is clear that the social decision was made to give
priority to the “maintenance of a full-time [commercial] fishery.” As DEM explains
what it views as the consequence of ‘allowing too many people access to the resource’
in the 2012 Management Plan for the Finfish Fishery Sector:
DEM’s interest in limiting participation in the quota-managed fisheries is not
based purely on concern for stock dynamics since quotas limit total landings
within the State and since these species are migratory, Rhode Island landings
account for only a portion of the total. The main concern is with allowing too
many people access to the resource, which would impact current license
holders through shorter seasons, lower possession limits, and ultimately fewer
pounds of fish (Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management,
2012, p.2).

In practice, Rhode Island distributes the state’s fluke quota across three separate subperiods, and enforces trip limits on vessels (that are not participating in the fluke
sector pilot program) to ensure the quota lasts throughout each sub-period and the
year. In regard to the perceived impact new entry has on existing interests, this can be
calculated by multiplying the daily or weekly trip limit by the number of days or
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weeks in each sub-period. This represents the top of a harvest range, given limiting
factors such as weather, vessel size, distance to fishing grounds, and the size of the
daily/trip limit.
Flexibility
Context matters when discussing the notion of flexibility in fisheries management.
Situated within Scott’s normative and cognitive pillars, ideas about what constitutes
‘flexibility’ vary within limited entry between licensing and allocating fish (catch
shares). Of the 35 codes comprising this category, 12 were coded as normative and 23
were cognitive (Figure 9).
.
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Figure 9. Dimensions of Flexibility
In regard to the licensing process in 2002, flexibility is the ability (or inability)
to participate in multiple fisheries and closely align with ideas around access. With
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catch shares, and the commodification of the resource (fish, not licenses), the concept
of flexibility is expanded to encapsulate the trading or sale of quota, and the
prosecution of the fishery. For example, flexibility could be the creation of an
unrestricted market for trading, leasing, or buying quota, or could be manifested in an
ability to operate under fewer input controls such as closures or trip limits.
The flexibility discussion focused on the structure of a new licensing program.
Some respondents talked about flexibility as a fisherman’s ability to participate in
multiple fisheries. In this sense, the term does not relate to a fisherman’s flexibility to
harvest an allocation over the course of a fishing year, as is allowed for in the state’s
existing sector pilot program. In this analysis, regulatory flexibility relates to the
structure of management plans – particularly licensing programs, while specialization
is meant to define fisherman’s behavior in response to management plans.
The idea of flexibility and specialization in the fishery – especially in respect to the
normative and cognitive institutional pillars - is closely aligned with perceptions of
opportunity. Opportunity can be understood in two ways: the opportunity to simply
participate in the fishery and the opportunity to prosecute a range of fisheries. In
practice, this is the difference between obtaining a CFL, or upgrading to an MPL with
a RFF or other restricted endorsement. In 2001 there was desire to allow new entrants
to prosecute multiple fisheries. As one respondent stated: "[You] don't want to create
anything that is too rigid, that doesn't create opportunity" (110209_002:532). In this
way, opportunity is closely related to specialization and the discussion around access.
The transition from the flexibility to prosecute multiple fisheries to specialization in a
fishery is nicely captured in the following remarks:
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One particular gentleman who was out of Apponaug Cove, in my view he was
the consummate waterman on the bay. So, in the summer time, he would take his
40 foot boat and go down to the Point and put out 500 lobster pots and he would
work those lobster pots probably until September, then he would pull all of his
lobster pots, he'd come up in the bay, store those, put winkle pots onboard, and
then he'd throw all winkle pots up in the bay catching conchs for snail salad. And
he would work those all fall until the first snow. And in the meantime in the fall
while he was doing that he was running eel pots. But that would only be usually a
couple of weeks, so then he would put those away and still concentrate on conchs
for a couple of months until the first snow fall. Then he'd pull the conch pots out,
and then he would be bullraking during the colder winter months and then when
the waters warmed up in the spring, and the eels started running again, he would
do eel pots, and then after that two week period was over he'd go back to his
lobster pots, so he would repeat this cycle every year so he was constantly
moving around depending upon which fishery was most abundant. And, to me,
that's the ultimate flexibility that the multipurpose license offers. But people
ended up concentrating more and more on one species and pretty much do that
year round. And so, ultimately, what you have now is a system where those
people whose primary effort was in that one fishery are the ones right now that
basically have access to those resources. (110208_002:425).

It was noted that the regulations developed by the DEM, "Provided for a methodology
for you to get into other fisheries, but it really pushed a lot of restrictions and burdens
to enter into another fishery whereas before it had a lot of flexibility"
(110208_001:430). The same interviewee continued by saying, "Under the existing
rules it is difficult for someone to obtain enough different primary effort endorsements
to allow you the flexibility to work on certain species like the classic waterman did
decades ago, with one license, a multipurpose license" (110208_001:415). Responses
to Question 1 of the survey instrument indicate that flexibility was a core
consideration of the 2002 Act, with another interviewee remarking that the Act sought,
“to allow flexibility” across fisheries. This is ultimately reflected in the tiered
licensing structure designed by the RI DEM in response to the 2002 legislation. While
the focus of the CI process and General Assembly may have been on licensing, to
reconcile the two, flexibility must be considered in respect to catch share management.
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In regard to current norms and worldviews about flexibility in Rhode Island,
one person stated:
My leanings are more toward the free and common fishery with a more open
access and the ability of license holders to move freely amongst the fisheries that
they want to concentrate on, given market conditions, and given the level of
sustainable resource available. So clearly that has to be regulated carefully by
DEM Fish and Wildlife, as well as the other fishing regulation commissions
along the Atlantic Coast (110208_001:410).

This statement also recognizes that this view may be constrained by a quilt of fishing
regulations enacted by states and the federal government.
Sustainability
The grounded theory category of sustainability emerged from the code book
within the normative and cognitive institutional pillars from a total of fifty-nine (n=59)
individual codes. Reponses indicate that the Act sought to address sustainability on
multiple fronts. Of the fifty nine codes constituting sustainability, twenty-four of the
codes (n=24) applied to fisheries, while another twenty-eight (n=28) addressed
fishermen, and four (n=4) applied to sustaining the working waterfront. Three codes
(n=3) spoke to the balancing the interests of the fishery resource with the needs of
fishermen, and were not coded into initial categories. In this analysis, sustainability
appears to be closely aligned with the access category, particularly as it relates to
fishermen (Figure 10).
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Figure 10. Dimensions of Sustainability
As cited in the Chapter 2 discussion of the bio-economic rational for managing
fisheries, “fish populations are continuously renewed, and the rate of renewal depends
on the size of the population which is left unharvested to produce new generations”
(Schaefer, 1959, p.100). In this way the sustainability of fisheries – summer flounder
included – hinges on the limiting overall mortality in the stock to a level that allows
for the population to renew.
In discussing the intent on the Act, interviewees noted that the bill was
authored against a backdrop of overfishing and overfished stocks (110216_001:662).
This is confirmed in DEM’s Report on the Status of Marine Fisheries Stocks and
Fisheries Management Issues in Rhode Island, released in March of 2001 (Vallerie
and Murphy, 2001). Language contained in the Act itself (RIGL 20.2-1), and
responses to the interview instrument, indicates the legislation sought to addess these
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issues head on. For example, respondents indicated that, “stocks were being depleted,”
and that the Act looked to “protect the health of the resource” (110201_001:66) and
“end overfishing” (110201_001:67). Others noted that the Act sought to acknowledge
that, "Fisheries themselves aren't stable" (110209_002:570), but that a goal was to
“maintain stock status in perpetuity” (110208_001:450). With stocks like summer
flounder being overfished in 2000 – and with overfishing occurring – achieving longterm sustainability of the resource required limiting overall mortality in the fishery
(both natural and fishing). To do so, those close to the CI process suggested that that
Act sought to curtail fishing effort as a proxy for mortality. Some believed that there
was too much fishing effort “prevent[ing] renewal and regeneration of the fishery”
(110216:001:660).
In regard to sustainability of the resource – one interviewee suggested that the
managers and industry need to, "Understand the balance between harvest capacity and
resource availability in order to be sustainable" (110204_004:208). While harvest
capacity is an important measure of the rate at which fisheries can be utilized, I would
argue that the sustainability of the resource hinges on limiting the total removals from
the population.
In addressing the sustainability of fishermen, it is important to acknowledge “it
is biologically possible to have a sustained fishery at any of a wide range of fishing
efforts. The problem is to decide which of these is most desirable” (Schaefer, 1959,
p.102). In this way, the idea of sustainability in regard to fishermen gets at the heart of
the new entry issue, and the challenge presented in the social decision of determining
who can access the resource. Data collected through the interview instrument shows
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that the Act sought to preserve opportunities for existing fishermen while allowing for
new entry. One person noted that it aimed to allow "existing licensed fishermen to
continue on with the fisheries that they were engaged in" (110208_001:442). More
specifically, there was a preference to provide for full-time fishermen, which is
covered earlier in this analysis. As an interviewee stated: "Priority was given to
maintenance of a full-time fishery. So, it recognized that to maintain that, you couldn't
just divide a limited level of total catch among an ever-expanding number of
participants" (110209_002:568). This is an important reflection on the intent of the
Act, and suggests that the preservation of a full-time commercial fleet hinges on
yielding some level of economic rent (total revenue – total cost) from the fishery.
Maintenance of a full-time fishery also implies the continuation of shore-side services
and a working waterfront that can support the needs of the fleet (fuel, ice, offloading
facilities, dockage). The same person also said there was a desire to: “maintain Point
Judith as a full-time port” (110209_002:569). This is a notable goal, given the
multitude of federal fisheries that are prosecuted by vessels homeported in Point
Judith.
Another key theme that emerged in this category was the perception that the
majority of the fishing industry was aging, saying: "We really felt we were getting
older" (110217_001:786). This “graying” (110216_001:655) of the fleet appeared to
be threatening what some people perceived as the very sustainability of Rhode
Island’s fishing community:
Then you have the thought of a fishery that if there isn't adequate opportunity for
new entry you could lose its vibrancy and its strength because it would become
sort of top-heavy with his veterans and you needed to be able to mentor and
foster new, young, fisherman is what ultimately replace retirees and keep the
fishing industry going in a very healthy and vibrant way. (110201_001:23)
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In the licensing program constructed by the state, an exit/entry system allows for
‘new’ and/or ‘young’ fishermen to join the ranks and learn from ‘veterans.’ At
question in Rhode Island is whether or not entry mechanisms into a catch share fishery
could be constructed to foster the ‘healthy’ and ‘vibrant’ fishing industry that was
aspired to in 2001?
Fisheries Management: Commodities and Rights-Based Management
Fisheries Management emerged from the data as a grounded theory category,
with commodities and rights-based management forming its dimensions and
properties. This category is more theoretical than practical in nature, as many
responses relate to the perceived advantages and disadvantages of commodifying
licenses and quota (Figure 11).
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Figure 11. Dimensions of Fisheries Management

72

One response portrays the commodification of public resources in two distinct
and separate ways:
It is essentially what are society is based on is the notion of tradable
commodities. That is free-enterprise, that is the American economic system,
on the one hand. On the other hand, we are talking about a very interesting
and the more I have dealt with it, the more I have become convinced, a very
unique public resource, analogous to trees in a state forest, or birds, or any
other living or natural publically owned resource. There is a public trust
responsibility to manage those resources in accordance with the public's
interest. (110201_001:34)

From this individual’s perspective, there is a tension between creating a tradable
commodity from which an individual benefits and managing the resource in the public
interest. Responses by those close to the process show that a range of policy options
was considered by the GA and in the CI process – including catch shares. One
respondent suggested that rights-based management (see Chapter 2) is a way to
achieve conservation of the resource:
One of the things that was encouraged was the conservation of the resource,
something that they would like to have a long-term value in. So that would, if
you privatize it that way, through ITQs, it really says that you don't have open
access in any way, you have those with the quotas who have access, all others are
precluded" (110209_002:578)

In doing so, they state that the creation of individual quotas would inhibit others from
accessing the resource. Sectors are cooperative-like entities and not individual
transferable quotas or individual fishing quotas. As Rhode Island operates its fisheries
through limited entry, this code captures the essence of the tension between
maintaining new entry and allocating shares to a predetermined set of individuals.
Ultimately, interviews suggest that the GA’s intent was to address licenses – not
quota. In terms of creating individual shares of the resource, one interviewee stated:
And again, I don't believe that it was the General Assembly's intent to
establish individual shares. I think that was far from their minds quite frankly.

73

I think that what they really wanted was to just set up a licensing structure to
allow new entrants into the fishery and that was it. (110208_001:431).

While the CI process certainly considered the implications of pursuing rights-based
management programs, one interviewee explained that catch shares were “certainly
considered, [but] the legislature didn’t want to go there, [and] the decision was made
not to go in that direction (110216_001:629, 110216_001:630). The decision not to
“go there” and pursue catch shares as a form of limited entry in 2002 has left the DEM
without explicit policy guidance on how to develop management strategies and
regulations should normative or cognitive changes occur over time.
While the General Assembly elected not to explicitly pursue catch shares in the
General Laws, provisions for the transferability of a fishing business were included.
However, the sale of a business is limited to active license holders only. The thinking
in 2001 around this was that: "Well I think the ability to sell things came out of that.
You could sell your license. I think what they tried to do, was to recognize it as a
business. And allow you to be treated as a business, but also with the idea, that you try
to keep the free and common as much as you can." For others, the entry elements of
the free and common orthodoxy hold less weight: "A crucial factor is being able to
cash out" (110209_002). For some, the payout can be significant. As detailed in
Appendix III, a recent of search of Rhode Island Craigslist using the keyword
“fishing” yielded a posting offering a MPL with lobster traps for $25,000 (Craigslist
Rhode Island, accessed 12/31/12).
Analysis Three: Institutional Linkages
One of the challenges of managing transient finfish is defining where the state
fishery ends the federal fishery begins. While an invisible line three nautical miles off
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the coast delimits a political boundary, the interplay between state and federal fishery
institutions is less clear. The application of Scott’s institutional framework (1995) to
this research reveals that individual’s understandings of the fisheries management
situation in Rhode Island in 2002 was based on a series of linked fisheries institutions
present regionally and globally. At question is whether or not a globalized set of
fisheries institutions is also shaping each individual’s understanding and expectations
around fisheries management in Rhode Island. To further explore this question, the
fisheries institutions captured though this research are examined through Young’s
(1996) institutional linkages.
Institutional linkages help to illustrate the research situation more broadly, and
capture how shifts how paradigm shifts occur. The globalization of fisheries
institutions can be viewed as a relatively recent phenomenon in the management of
Rhode Island’s fisheries. Approached from this perspective, the centuries-old belief in
a “right to fish” (110216_001:604) is not out of touch with state-based fisheries
institutions. For the better part of the 20th century, the only set of management
institutions that applied to Rhode Island fishermen was constructed by the General
Assembly and DEM. More formal management measures came to pass through
creation of the Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council in 1976, and later through the
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (Nixon, 2001).
While states retain the right to control fisheries within their territorial waters
through the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 (43 U.S.C. § 1311), it is not uncommon for
a fisherman or fishing business to possess both state and federal permits. These
fishermen are bound by different rules and regulations when operating in state and
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federal fisheries – and are therefore subject to a wide range of management regimes
that may differ from those in Rhode Island’s state waters fishery. For example,
Limited access programs have been in place in the New England Fishery Management
Council’s Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan since 1994 (59 CFR
9872, 03/01/94), in the Atlantic Sea Scallop Fishery Management Plan since 1994 (59
CFR 433, 01/19/94).
Similarly, state managers often find themselves engaged in federal fisheries
management. Section 302 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act creates a state interest in the
management of federal fisheries by providing for a voting seat for “a principle state
official with marine fishery management responsibility,” on the regional Fishery
Management Council (16 U.S.C. 1852 (b)(1)(A)). In Rhode Island, this duty is carried
out by the Department of Environmental Management – the same state agency that
manages fisheries in state waters. Rhode Island’s direct involvement in the
management of both state and federal fisheries is a means by which regional - and
international - fisheries institutions can come to influence fisheries management at the
state level.
In this research, responses to interview questions revealed an understanding of
fisheries institutions not present in the management of Rhode Island’s state fisheries.
For example, multiple respondents spoke to limited entry and ITQ management
schemes in Alaska (110207_002:221), Iceland (110204_004:91), and Australia
(110217_001:757). Others were witnessing a transition to sector management (catch
shares) in the Northeast multispecies (groundfish) fishery (110204_004:95). Finally,
the development and ratification of the Catch Share Policy by NOAA Fisheries in
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Novermber of 2010 illustrates a new national approach (NOAA Catch Share Policy,
accessed 12/22/12). Therefore, it is useful to describe the apparent dichotomy between
state and global fishery institutions, and highlight the blurred sense institutions present
in Rhode Island fisheries.
In addition to cultural carriers in Rhode Island, fisheries institutions may also
be transported through peer-reviewed scholarly journals. Though one respondent felt
that "Whether it was during the licensing restructuring or any other time, there are
very few people either in the fishing industry or in the fishery management system,
that do much reading about fishery management" (110207_002:236), Macinko and
Whitmore (2010) write in their analysis of groundfish sectors for the Massachusetts
Division of Marine Fisheries that “sectors are thus a home-grown concept being
debated within a context that is inextricably linked to national events and a halfcentury of fisheries literature” (p.18). While the Ocean State continues to retain longstanding fisheries institutions that comprise a storied fishing tradition, an ever
increasing number of institutional linkages with interstate, federal, and international
management regimes have effectively expanded what the collective perceives as being
possible.
By one account, the authors of the Act expected further institutional shifts in
fisheries management:
Ok, if one set of ideas was reasonable for this point in time, and they continue
to be in play although the era that gave rise to them has passed, and if another
set of ideas became reasonable at another point in time, and those ideas
remain part of it although that era has passed, why should we then think, that
the thinking of this moment is not also time limited. And if we can see that the
larger course of things is, um, moving at levels that aren't really susceptible to
change by current fisheries management, do we have to then adjust what we
are doing to reflect that? And that’s what you sort of in a way are getting at.
We did what we did in 2002 based on the presenting symptoms, and looking
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at some underlying value sets and said how do we sustain full time fishery in
Rhode Island with its center being the port of Point Judith/Galilee. Right?
That’s a legitimate thing. But, ah, I have no supposition that it is the answer,
in fact I would have been shocked if anyone had said this is, "the answer." I
was trying to design something that would work for, you know, a decade,
plus? Never did I think it was going to be a long enduring answer.
(110209_002:555)
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Answering what was an ostensibly straightforward research hypothesis proved to
be more nuanced than the question would suggest. At the outset of this research I
hypothesized that the catch share programs in Rhode Island’s marine fisheries are
inconsistent with existing state policy regarding new entry in limited entry programs.
The research reveals that the licensing approach crafted in response to RIGL 20-2.1 to
enable new entry, and the catch share pilot program, appear to be practically
compatible, but normatively and cognitively inconsistent. All licensed fishermen could
either operate in the common-pool under trip limits, or voluntarily opt into a sector.
However, the policy and management decision to pursue catch shares by the DEM
does not comport with the norms, values, and expectations that form the intent to the
RIGL 20.2-1. This research shows that catch shares were discussed during the
development of the Act, but that the General Assembly did not intend to provide for
individual allocations or commoditize fish through state law. At the same time, the
research revealed that an expanding number of fisheries institutions are present in
Rhode Island in 2012, and that there may in fact be a disconnect between what is
socially desirable today, and what was decided upon a decade ago. The institutional
differences present in Rhode Island’s fisheries cannot be reconciled through a
management action, and should be addressed through a public process.
At the outset of this research I suggest that catch share management may be at
odds with the policy goal of preserving new entry into Rhode Island’s commercial
fisheries because catch share programs divide the total allowable catch among a
predetermined set of entities based on a set of qualifying criteria. Part one of the
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analyses clearly illustrates that providing opportunity for entry into the state fisheries
was one intent of the Act. The licensing program that the DEM developed as a result
of the Act (described in Chapter 2) provides a mechanism for entry into all state
managed fisheries. In practice, the licensing program allows for fishermen with PELs
and RFF endorsements to harvest at full possession limits. For new entrants who
receive upgraded license through the exit/entry lottery (PEL with RFF), there appears
to be no intent in the 2002 Act that would preclude them from the same opportunity to
use this license as any other active license holder with an equivalent license (MPL, or
PEL with RFF). The hybrid approach of sectors and the common-pool (to borrow
from the northeast Multispecies FMP vernacular) appears to keep new entrants on par
with other equivalent license holders operating in the common-pool under trip limits
or in weekly aggregate landings programs. The situation becomes more technical if a
new entrant who had gained access to the summer flounder fishery after 2008 were to
form a new sector or join the Fluke Conservation Cooperative. Under state sector
regulations, that new entrant would have no allocation, having not participated in the
fishery between 2004 and 2008. Given the values expressed by some of the
interviewees, this may be a perfectly acceptable situation in 2012. For others, this
represents the antithesis of what the Act sought to accomplish.
The zero allocation scenario is a situation that the General Assembly did not –
and could not – contemplate in 2002. While it was their express intent to develop a
licensing program, a decision not to pursue one form of management over another
does not condemn it from ever being considered. It would be inaccurate to describe the
General Assembly’s decision to not pursue catch share management in 2002 as a flat
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and final rejection of that form of limited entry. Interview data suggest that the law
was written to address an acute set of issues, and that while a set of prevailing
institutions continue to inform Rhode Island’s unique approach to fisheries
management, these rules, values, and worldviews are now nested within a broader set
of global fisheries institutions. Perhaps in future research, a salient policy question to
ask and debate in Rhode Island would be, ‘who does the Act seek to benefit?’
Recommendations
Preserve the Exit/Entry System into Restricted Fisheries – I noted at the outset of
this research that Rhode Island is one of the last states to continue to provide
opportunity for entry into commercial fishing. It is clear that Rhode Island continues
to value entry into state fisheries through the annual granting of new endorsements –
and as illustrated in the uptick in new RFF endorsements this past year. In the case of
upgrading to a PEL with a RFF endorsement, “new” simply constitutes “expanded”
access for individuals already running their own vessel or who are employed as crew.
These license holders may constitute elements of the full-time fishery that the Act also
seeks to protect. As a practical matter, individuals upgrading their licenses to a RFF
endorsement constitute a fraction of a percent of active license holders. Even so, these
are the same individuals that the Act and the Riley decision seek to protect.
The established control date in the summer flounder could render access
granted through the entry/exit process meaningless for endorsements that are issued
after December 31st, 2009. If Rhode Island elects to continue to pursue catch share
management – with or without new legislation – the state should work to address the
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licensing and allocation circumstances of these vested fishermen who have historically
migrated from the back deck to the wheelhouse.
Revisit RIGL 20.2-1 - A shift in management approaches as manifested in the sector
pilot program in the summer flounder fishery has raised a new suite of policy issues
that were not explicitly addressed in the CI process, by the Act itself, or in Riley vs.
DEM. Specifically, a vacuum of policy guidance exists around the allocation and
commodification of fish. Answering that question entails a policy discussion of who
should benefit from the public resource. Diverging institutional perspectives have
turned the sector pilot program into a contentious fishery issue that is akin to the
adoption of a licensing system that some felt could only be settled by the General
Assembly. Rather than hinge management actions on broad legal authority and the
discretion of DEM, the state should look to codify a new law that is reflective of the
current values, norms, and orthodoxies in Rhode Island. The United States Congress
revisits the Magnuson-Stevens Act every ten years, and Rhode Island General
Assembly should consider doing the same.
Rhode Island should expand the criteria for assessing catch shares: While DEM
has asked a series of general questions regarding the feasibility of the pilot program,
the State elected to evaluate the catch share pilot program on three criteria: safety at
sea, resource issues, and economic performance. Each issue is deserving of evaluation,
but the sum of these programmatic elements constitute a fraction of the categories
individuals raised in responses to the survey instrument. Beyond considering the full
range of intents of existing state statute, the state should also reflect on the guiding
principles of NOAA’s catch share policy guide. Catch share programs are data hungry,
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and costly to implement and sustain – witness the recent experiences of New
England’s groundfish sectors.
Conclusion
Prior to the 2002 legislation, Nixon writes that, “The common perception of
fisheries law in Rhode Island is that our unique history has somehow frozen us in time
and limited our choices for the future…That is simply not the case; the General
Assembly has the power to do whatever it thinks is best in the state's interest” (2001,
pp.7-8). This research illustrates that fisheries institutions continue to evolve in the
Ocean State. Moreover, the Act itself was not imagined or intended to provide a longterm solution for all fisheries management issues in Rhode Island. A possible outcome
of this exercise could be that there is no change to the state law – but there is no way
of knowing unless we attempt to understand. Tackling these issues will require
continued public deliberation, much like the work being led by the DEM under the
Direction of current Director. The Coastal Institute, as a neutral entity, successfully
shepherded fisheries reform in Rhode Island ten years ago and should be tapped to
lead subsequent policy discussions.
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APPENDICES
Appendix I – RIGL 20-2.1-2
TITLE 20
Fish and Wildlife
CHAPTER 20-2.1
Commercial Fishing Licenses
SECTION 20-2.1-2

§ 20-2.1-2 Purposes. – The purposes of this chapter are, through a system of
licensure that is clear, predictable and adaptable to changing conditions, to:
(1) Preserve, enhance, and allow for any necessary regeneration of the fisheries of
the state, for the benefit of the people of the state, as an ecological asset and as a
source of food and recreation;
(2) Provide Rhode Islanders who wish to fish commercially the opportunity to do so
and end the moratorium on issuance of new commercial fishing licenses so that new
licenses may be issued for the year beginning January 1, 2003, and each year
thereafter;
(3) Allow residents who have fished commercially to sell their vessels and gear in a
manner that first, facilitates up-grading license levels among residents already in the
fishery; that second, provides lateral movement among residents who are holders of
commercial fishing licenses to other types of fishing; and that third, enables new
entrants into new commercial fishing;
(4) Respect the interests of residents who fish under licenses issued by the state and
wish to continue to fish commercially in a manner that is economically viable:
provided, it is specifically not a purpose of this chapter to establish licensing
procedures that eliminate the ability to fish commercially of any resident as of the date
of enactment who validly holds commercial fishing license and who meets the
application renewal requirements set forth herein;
(5) Preserve and enhance full-time commercial fishing, with a high degree of
participation by owner operated vessels, as a way of life and as a significant industry
in Rhode Island;
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(6) Establish principles, for a system of adaptive management, that shall be used by
the department in licensure programs and fisheries management, which principles
shall include:
(i) The foregoing purposes; and
(ii) As appropriate, necessary, and effective, the following measures:
(A) Regulation of the design and use of gear;
(B) Limitations on the amount of gear that may be used by a license holder;
(C) Restrictions on when and where commercial fishing may be done;
(D) Quotas and limitations on catch or landings; and
(E) Restrictions on the number of license holders;
(7) Provide a licensure system that facilitates data collection and management so that
marine fisheries can be managed more efficiently and effectively. In accordance with
this purpose, the system shall include a firm annual renewal deadline, as established
herein, for the submittal of applications to renew licenses or obtain new licenses. An
annual grace period, as established herein, shall allow fishermen an additional
opportunity to renew their licenses from the immediately preceding year, subject to
payment of a late fee; however, after the expiration of the grace period, there shall be
no opportunity to appeal the denial of a commercial fishing license unless the
applicant can show that the failure to apply during the grace period was due to
documented medical hardship.
History of Section.
(P.L. 2002, ch. 47, § 4; P.L. 2004, ch. 8, § 3; P.L. 2004, ch. 16, § 3.)
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Appendix II – Final Survey Instrument
The University of Rhode Island
Department of Marine Affairs
Washburn Hall, 80 Upper College Road, Kingston, RI, 02881
Limited Entry in Rhode Island:
Tracing an Idea from Open Access to License Limitation to Catch Shares
Semi-Structured Interview Questions:
1. In your opinion, what was the legislature intending to accomplish through the 2002
License Reform Act?
☐ In your opinion, what does this act seek to protect?
☐ In your opinion, who does this act seek to protect?
☐Why do you think the legislature included provisions for making new and
additional restricted licenses and endorsements available to Rhode Island
residents?
☐ Why is the concept of new entry into commercial fisheries important
to the people of Rhode Island?
2. Rhode Island’s existing licensing program seems to create a license hierarchy
because fishermen with MPLs can fish for almost all state managed species, while
fishermen with PELs and CFLs need endorsements to catch these species, and not all
endorsements are available. Does it matter if new entrants cannot fish for the same
species as established fishermen? Why/Why not?
3. Are you familiar with the concept of “catch shares” in fisheries management? If
yes, proceed to question. If no, read the following: “Catch shares are a general term
for several fishery management strategies that allocate a specific portion of the total
allowable catch to individuals, cooperative, communities, or other entities” (NOAA,
2010).
☐ In your opinion, did the legislature consider “catch shares” in Rhode
Island fisheries when they were developing this legislation? Why/Why not?
4. To what extent, if any, do you think that legislature intended to create tradable
commodities through access privileges? Why/Why not?
☐ Do you think the legislature intended to create a system where fishermen
could benefit from commercial fishing without ever catching a fish?
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5. In your opinion, should there still be new entry into Rhode Island’s fisheries?
☐ Should new entry be allowed into all fisheries sectors (Lobster, Finfish,
Shellfish)? Why/Why not?
6. In your opinion, should Rhode Island’s fisheries be allowed to be transformed into
tradable commodities? What are the advantages/disadvantages of this approach?
.

87

Appendix III – Commercial Fishing License Posting

Jonathon  Peros  <jonathon.peros@gmail.com>

RI  Commercial  Fishing  License  -  $25000
1  message
jonathon.peros@gmail.com  <jonathon.peros@gmail.com>
To:  jonathon.peros@gmail.com

Sun,  Dec  30,  2012  at  7:03  PM

jonathon.peros@gmail.com  has  forwarded  you  this  craigslist.org  posting.
Please  see  below  for  more  information.
Visit  the  posting  at  http://providence.craigslist.org/bfs/3489113341.html  to  contact  the  person  who  posted  this.

RI  Commercial  Fishing  License
Date:  2012-12-19,  12:04PM
RI  State  waters  commercial  fishing  license  with  349  lobster  trap  allocation.  License  includes  whelk  endorsement
(no  longer  available)  and  restricted  finfish  endorsement  (sea  bass,  scup,  fluke,  tautog,  striper,  weakfish).  Also,
have  lobster  traps  available  that  fish  great  on  the  beach.  Email  me  with  your  name  and  phone  number  and  I  will
call  you  back.  
it's  NOT  ok  to  contact  this  poster  with  services  or  other  commercial  interests
Original  URL:  http://providence.craigslist.org/bfs/3489113341.html
this  craigslist  posting  was  forwarded  to  you  by  someone  using  our  email-a-friend  feature  -  if  you  want  to  prevent
these,  please  go  to:
http://www.craigslist.org/cgi-bin/te/U2FsdGVkX18zMjE5MzMyMZ6yDAdZAQ
Ioq4mdurkyveCh9b5CcImq38ug8pUOxlgFWodP89AMvKKDca6RXdxK7w
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